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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Contrasting with conventional banks, Islamic banks 
(IBs) have to adhere to Islamic law in their contacts. 
Among the rules that Sharia prescribes are the 
prohibition of paying and charging of interest and 
prohibition of speculation (Hidayat, 2010). As a 
result, there are differences in the method of 
presentation; disclosure between Islamic and 
conventional banks and differences in the 
accountability for each bank. In the context of 
accountability, one of the main objectives of 
accounting is to provide a fair information flow 
between the accountant and the account (Anuar et 
al., 2009). Concerned with this concept, accounting 
plays a significant role in providing information to 
all stakeholders as well the society, and to fill any 
religious duty as indicated by Adnan and Gaffikin 
(1997): “the orientation of accounting towards 
fulfilling the accountability of human being to God 
implies that the accounting information enables 
individuals to account for their zakat” (p. 33). 
Therefore, firms are accountable for publishing their 
reports (Gray et al., 1995) for the benefit of users as 
well as satisfy their needs of stakeholders about 
bank’ accountabilities compliance. 
The main objectives of this paper explore the 
extent to which the disclosure level for IBs reflects 
the main three pillars of Islamic accountabilities 
which contain Sharia, social and financial. It 
critically evaluates the degree of disclosure practices 
of IBs about its accountabilities through the annual 
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This study seeks to examine disclosure levels in the annual report 
and websites related to Islamic accountability pillars which are 
Sharia, social and financial. The study also aims to measure the 
association between disclosure levels and firm-specific 
characteristics. The manual content analysis is employed. Our 
sample consists of 117 Islamic banks (IBs) based on data of 2016 
across 23 countries. The authors adopted 3 indices for Corporate 
Social Responsibility Report (CSRR); Sharia Supervisory Board 
Report (SSBR) and financial statements (FS) based on holistic 
benchmark. Descriptive analysis shows relatively high disclosure 
level for financial and Sharia disclosure (62% and 52% respectively) 
and relatively low for social disclosure (28%). Concerned with 
holistic disclosure level that measuring accountability’ pillars for 
all sections in the annual report, disclosure levels about Sharia, 
social and financial are 40%; 28% and 81% respectively. The 
regression analysis shows partial positive significant association 
of disclosure levels with existing Sharia auditing department; size 
of bank and probability in additional to Sharia auditing 
department. This study is the first one that investigates a holistic 
framework about Islamic accountabilities for IBs around the world 
(117 across 23 countries). It is also the first one that measuring 
the accountability concept in all sections in the annual report for 
IBs as well as their websites.  
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reports and websites for all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the paper seeks to explore the 
association between disclosure levels about 
accountabilities pillars and bank-specific 
characteristics as accounting standards; profitability; 
leverage and size. The analysis contains also control 
variables to investigate the differences between the 
selected banks in different countries. Despite these 
concerns, there are very few academic studies that 
investigate the disclosure levels for all accountability 
pillars reporting and for a large sample of IBs. 
Further, as we know there is no study that examines 
the association between disclosure levels of IBs’ 
accountability pillars and firm-specific 
characteristics for most of IBs around the world. 
Based on our knowledge; there are no any previous 
studies explore the comprehensive pillars of 
accountabilities (Sharia, social and financial) for IBs 
in one study. Considering these gaps in the 
literature, we first develop and apply three indices 
to measure the disclosures about the accountability 
of IBs related to CSR; SSBR and financial statements. 
Also, we explore the disclosure levels about Sharia, 
social and financial in whole segments in the annual 
report as vision; mission; strategy report and CEO 
statement. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) examined the 
disclosure of information deemed crucial to Islamic 
ethics in business. They found a major gap between 
the communicated and ideal ethical disclosure in the 
annual reports of a sample of seven IBs. 
Consequently, this study aims to explore all 
accountabilities for IBs in a different culture to see 
to what extent it can effect on the disclosure levels 
about accountability. The number of sample banks 
used in the literature was limited as acknowledged 
by Maali et al (2006), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). Our 
sample is relatively large (117) compared to the 
largest study so far (90 in Mallinb et al., 2014). It 
also more comprehensive based on exploring all 
accountabilities for IBs. A number of studies 
referred to AAOIFI standards (Hassan & Harahap, 
2010), none of them add AAOIFI standards items in 
the indices that tested as standard No.7 for CSR; 
standards No.1 for presentations and disclosure in 
the annual report and standards No.1; 2; 5 for SSB 
report in one study. 
Our paper is motivated to bridge a perceived 
gap between the three broad components of social; 
Sharia and financial disclosure levels. Secondly, calls 
for greater accountability from corporations are 
regularly voiced these days, both in the academic 
literature and in public discussions more generally 
(Messner, 2009). In accounting research concern to 
more accountability has been shared by those who 
have criticized extant financial and management 
accounting practices for contributing to what they 
see as a very limited understanding of accountability 
(e.g. Gray, 2001; McKernan & MacLullich, 2004; 
Young, 2006). There has been extensive research 
measure the corporate disclosure for banks (e.g., Al 
Baluchi, 2006; Ibrahim et al., 2011) without 
segregate between the three accountabilities 
disclosure. Also, the accountability issue for IBs has 
been unexplored (Hasan & Siti-Nabiha, 2010). 
However, there are very limited studies that focus on 
disclosure analysis related to Sharia, social; financial 
disclosure levels. During recent years there has been 
a growing interest in Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) across a range of disciplines as one of the 
accountabilities for IBs. Researchers strongly believe 
that corporations should not be judged just on their 
economic success (Jamali et al., 2008, Shahin & Zairi, 
2007). Even though CSR is becoming increasingly 
significant, research still shows that CSR 
performance and CSR reporting (CSRR) by 
companies all over the world is limited. Moreover, 
our research is motivated to answer the question 
about the difference between the required 
information that should be published in the 
corporate annual reports based on the Islamic 
perspective as well Islamic standards as AAOIFI and 
what is presently being practised by these banks 
around the world (e.g., Baydoun & Willet, 2000; 
Lewis, 2001; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 
2006). Most of the literature that tests disclosure for 
IBs focuses mainly on measuring the disclosure 
levels with a study that explores the determents of 
corporate disclosure (Ousama & Fatima, 2010; 
Sarea & Hanefah, 2013). Also, there is a lack of 
literature on disclosure in IFIs context, particularly 
on IBs, as prior studies have not considered 
different categories of disclosure for this sector. 
This gap in the literature needs to be explored and 
filled. 
Our paper differs from the previous studies 
that explore the disclosure level for Islamic banks in 
many ways. Our paper differs from Khan et al., 2013 
and Farook et al., 2011 who measure one dimension 
of disclosure, which is CSRD, whereas our research 
measures the three dimensions. Gisbert and Navallas 
(2013), Samaha et al. (2012) examine the disclosure 
level for banks that located in one country (Spain 
and Egypt respectively), whereas; our paper 
examines disclosure level for banks across 23 
countries. Our paper differs from El-Halaby and 
Hussainey (2016) who measure the three pillars of 
disclosure but for just 43 banks and based on 
AAOIFI standards and annual report only, whereas 
our study uses data for 117 banks and measures 
disclosure level more than compliance level with 
AAOIFI and extend scope of disclosure to include 
additional sections as vision and mission as well as 
strategy report and corporate governance report. 
They choose IBs that adopt AAOIFI in the MENA 
area, whereas we choose all available IBs around the 
world. 
Our findings show high variations in disclosure 
reporting practices about Islamic accountabilities’ 
pillars across the sample and countries with a clear 
tendency to focus on financial disclosure 
accountability more than other accountabilities. The 
average disclosure scores are relatively low (28%) for 
social throughout the whole banks examined and 
relatively high (more than 50%) for Sharia and 
financial disclosure. These scores indicate that the 
banks disclose less information about social and fail 
to follow the Islamic standards as AAOIFI guidelines 
as the best practices, particularly for social 
disclosure. Furthermore, the high scores indicate 
that although the banks disclose information about 
financial accountability related to financial 
statements, they fail to disclose the financial 
statements that concerned with Islamic 
identification as Zakat and Qard Hassan statement. 
Our empirical results show that the disclosure levels 
are significantly affected by standards, the size of 
the firm, SAD. The empirical results also show 
different correlation based on a different model or 
different disclosure kind. 
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Based on these findings, this paper makes 
several incremental contributions to the literature 
on Islamic accountability and IBs. First, we apply an 
objective; a holistic and context-specific measure of 
the accountabilities reporting for any IFI based on 
Islamic approaches (AAOIFI and related literature). 
As highlighted by Leuz and Wysocki (2008), there is 
a lack of a measure which combines all of the 
desirable properties for disclosure. The approach we 
follow which focuses on survey of all the sections in 
the annual report for IBs could be beneficial for 
future studies dealing with disclosures. Second, we 
add empirical evidence regarding the significant 
impact of the firm characteristics (accounting 
standards; SAD; size) on the quality of the 
disclosures about IBs’ accountability pillars. These 
results should be interested to IBs and regulators as 
they indicate that the requirement for banks to 
disclose annual reports contains value relevant 
information for IBs’ stakeholders in additional to 
satisfy Allah by sufficient disclosure. There have 
been a few empirical studies investigating the link 
between Islamic accountability pillars and different 
in the banking sector, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical study that investigates this 
relationship in IBs using a more comprehensive 
accountability disclosure indices which distinguish 
between Sharia, social and financial disclosures and 
applied on the most of IBs around the world. The 
paper’s themes are developed as follows: Section 2 
elaborates the accountability framework from an 
Islamic approach. Section 3 has a review of the three 
accountabilities of IBs. The relevant literature and 
developed hypotheses are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 discusses the research design. Section 6 
presents the empirical analysis and discusses the 
results. Section 7 outlines the conclusion and 
limitations with a suggestion for further research. 
 
2. ACCOUNTABILITIES OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
Hasan and Siti-Nabiha (2010) argue that issues 
regarding accountability in IBs need further 
research. Consequently, there is a need for good 
accountability practices in IBs as they are viewed as 
public trusts, existing for the benefit of society. A 
central Muslim belief is that Allah will account for 
everything on Judgment Day and every individual 
will be held accountable for what he did and 
whether their actions were in keeping with Sharia or 
not. Allah has mentioned that everybody will be 
asked about her/his actions. Also, the word Hesab 
(account) is mentioned more than 8 times in the 
Holy Quran (Askary & Clarke, 1997). Allah has 
mentioned in the Quran, every person will be asked 
to account for their actions on the Day of Judgment: 
“And stop them; indeed, they are to be 
questioned.”(Quran, 37:24) and said “So by your 
Lord, We will surely question them all, about what 
they used to do” (Quran, 15:92-93). As a result, every 
individual will be held accountable for their actions 
by Allah (Lewis, 2001). Accountability, then, is the 
core basis for the Muslims as well for Islamic system 
and all relationships within any Islamic society must 
consider this concept (Aljirari, 1996). 
Emdadul (2010) confirms the concept of 
accountability in Islam in the following statement: 
“Accountability to Allah for all activities is vital to a 
Muslim's faith. Sharia specifies how business should 
be conducted, organized and governed. Under Islam, 
the paramount rule in business is honesty, just 
measurement and fair dealing with the customers; 
such obligations impose a responsibility on the 
business community to adhere to moral 
accountability under Islam” (p.26). Samuel and 
Stewart (2009) point to the consequence of forming 
sustainable accountability. They add that most of 
the thinkers consider that there is no sustainable 
accountability; they are far from the reality because 
they were looking for enforced accountability and 
they ignore accountability that comes from deep 
belief as moral and ethics. Lewis (2006) argues that 
“accountability to God and the community for all 
activities is paramount to a Muslim’s faith” (p.2). Al-
Humaidhi (1999) states the mainstream of 
accountability in Islam is addressed on two levels. 
The first level is where every person is accountable 
for his actions. The second level comprises the 
accountability for individual and objects under their 
charge. Therefore, accountability of IBs is located 
under the second level through accountability 
towards all stakeholders. This accountability can 
achieve and is delivered by the disclosure in annual 
reports and website. The concept of disclosure is 
therefore connected with the concept of 
accountability: In an Islamic context, the Umma 
(nation) has the right to know how corporations that 
are part of the Umma affect its well-being (Maali 
et al., 2006). The accountability to disclose the truth 
is a very significant issue in the Islamic context, and 
this accountability applies to businesses (IBs) as 
much as to individuals. Importance of disclosure is 
highlighted in the Qur’an as Askary and Clarke 
(1997) argue that ‘Six verses of the Qur’an refer to 
relevance; one meaning of the relevance referred to 
is disclosure of all facts’. 
Disclosure is a crucial aspect of the 
accountability function of IBs to its stakeholders. 
Therefore, it is required that IBs disclose as much 
information in a succinct, truthful and 
comprehensible method to its stakeholders. From an 
Islamic perspective, the key purpose of corporate 
reporting that overrides other objectives is to allow 
Islamic enterprises to show their compliance with 
Sharia and serving the society (Baydoun & Willett 
2000). The consequence of this objective is that IBs 
have a responsibility to disclose all information 
essential to its stakeholders about their operations 
(Maali et al., 2006). Full disclosure about all 
accountabilities for IBs is derived from the divine 
duty of accountability that each Muslim bears. 
However, this is not to say that Allah needs to know 
through disclosure the activities of the IBs. Indeed, 
Allah knows and hears everything and is Omniscient: 
‘I know what you reveal and I know what you hide’ 
(Quran, 4:33) and also: ‘He knows what is manifest 
and He knows what is hidden’ (Quran, 96:7). IBs have 
a duty to disclose their compliance with the Sharia 
to stakeholders. Maali et al. (2006) explain, ‘the 
requirement for Muslims to uncover the truth is 
intended to help the community to know the effect 
of a person or a business on its wellbeing’ (p. 273). 
Maali et al. (2006) categorize three broad 
objectives that are used as the basis for 
accountability disclosures by IBs in order to show 
compliance with Sharia, to show how the operations 
of the business have affected the well-being of the 
Islamic community and to help Muslims to perform 
their religious duties. Based on the Islamic values, 
profit maximization should not be the only target of 
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IFIs (Ali et al., 2013). According to Hameed and 
Yahya (2003), IBs as an Islamic business institution 
is required not only to report its economic 
performance but also its Sharia compliance, social 
concern and environment concern to its 
stakeholders. Stakeholders are expected to have 
wider objectives covering Sharia, social value; ethical 
conduct as well as financial, which are a necessary 
part of their value proposition (Warde, 2013). The 
perception of disclosure from an Islamic approach is 
based on two general requirements: the concept of 
social accountability which contains Sharia and 
social disclosure and the full disclosure concept 
which focus on financial disclosure as well Sharia 
and social (Baydoun & Willett, 2000; Haniffa, 2002; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2002). Haniffa and Hudaib (2002) 
claimed that the full disclosure of applicable and 
reliable information should support external users 
in making both economic and religious decisions, in 
addition to assisting management in achieving their 
accountability to God; society and all other 
stakeholders. Based on Maali’ debating and based on 
our survey Quran and Sunna, IBs has 3 
accountability (Sharia, social and financial) which 
can be achieved through disclosure. Disclose these 
accountabilities is guided to satisfy Allah first and 
all stakeholders. In the following section, we explore 
the 3 kinds of accountabilities as follows: 
 
2.1. Sharia accountability 
 
In the context of Islam, the origin and the key aim of 
IFIs’ reporting is to show that their activities are in 
compliance with Sharia principles (Baydoun and 
Willet, 2000; Haniffa, 2002). Hameed (2001) claimed 
that the disclosure of Sharia compliance is one of 
the essential Islamic accounting purposes. 
Therefore, this information should be disclosed, 
even though it may not be required mandatory. The 
information about Sharia compliance is similar to 
that in the SSB report. The need for Sharia 
compliance becomes progressively significant to 
bridge the gap between models and practice (Sarea & 
Hanefah, 2013). To make sure that the religious 
prospects of those who deal with IBs have been met, 
IBs appoint Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSB) (Daoud, 
1996). They issue a report to the users confirming 
that the bank has adhered to Sharia (Karim, 1995). 
The accountabilities of SSB comprise ex-ante and ex-
post auditing of transactions, the calculation and 
payment of Zakat and counselling the bank on its 
accounting policies (Karim, 1995). This board 
provides the essential assurance for those who deal 
with IBs that their religious expectations have been 
met. SSB report is the main source for all 
stakeholders about achieving Sharia accountability 
for IBs. Disclosure by the SSB may be seen as a 
crucial aspect of accountability by the IBs to its 
stakeholders (Mallinb et al., 2014). 
 
2.2. Social accountability 
 
Corporations are expected to communicate their 
actions towards CSR to their broad range of 
stakeholders (Golob & Bartlett, 2007). CSR Reporting 
is mainly considered as one of the main approaches 
firms use to make the public aware of their CSR 
activities (Said et al., 2009). Several studies have 
used CSR disclosure as a proxy for corporate social 
performance (Gray et al., 2001, Milne & Adler, 1999, 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). CSR reporting in this sense 
“... extends the accountability of organisations, 
beyond the traditional role of providing a financial 
account to owners of capital, in particular, 
shareholders” (Gray et al., 1996, p.3). IFIs promote a 
social and ethical identity and the promotion of 
social welfare and justice are significant to IBs as 
part of their CSR (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). As 
trustees, man is accountable for God’s other 
creations and will be accountable for his actions in 
the hereafter (Baydoun & Willett, 2000; Maali et al., 
2006). Therefore, in Islam, a man’s accountability 
comprises accountability to the community and the 
environment. Thus, the companies are accountable 
to the society (Baydoun & Willett, 2000) hence they 
should disclose information, which can help 
discharge this accountability. From the Islamic 
perspective, CSR revolves around the concept of 
ultimate accountability to God where human beings 
are regarded as ‘khalifah’ (vicegerent) and are 
predictable to relate with other humans in order to 
take care of the natural environment entrusted to 
them (e.g., Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; 
Farook et al., 2011; Abbasi et al., 2012). Siwar and 
Hossain (2009) specified that Islam is not just a 
religion but as a complete way of life. Therefore, the 
philosophy of Islamic CSR is diverse from 
conventional CSR where CSR in Islam motivated not 
only on the economic perception but also 
incorporates the spiritual values as derived from the 
Quran and Sunna. So, we expect that IBs should 
disclose information about their roles towards 
society. CSR report is the ideal segment in the 
annual report to assist firms to satisfy their social 
accountability. 
 
2.3. Financial accountability 
 
Assessing the decision makers in stakeholders 
making of economic decisions is a secondary goal 
from the Islamic viewpoint, whereas in the Western 
model, achieving the financial accountability and 
maximizing the profit is considered the primary 
objective (Maali et al., 2006; Muwazir et al., 2006). 
IBs, similar to another financial firm, is expected to 
respond to their crucial stakeholders through good 
financial and governance performance (Belal et al., 
2014). The main objective of financial reporting is to 
provide information about the financial strength, 
performance and fluctuations in the financial 
position of an enterprise that is valuable to a wide 
range of users in making economic decisions. 
Therefore, corporations are responsible for 
publishing their financial reports for the benefit of 
stakeholders (Gray et al., 1991). Financial disclosure 
is very significant to whole stakeholders; it provides 
them with the essential information to diminish 
uncertainty and support them to make appropriate 
economic and financial decisions. The annual 
financial reports published by corporations are 
considered one of the most significant sources of 
information to outsiders (Betosan, 1997). But, as the 
uniqueness of IBs which required more financial 
disclosure about their operations, we expected that 
the financial statements for these banks will contain 
additional statements related to Zakat and Qard 
Hassan. 
The integration between Sharia, social and 
financial accountabilities and disclosure stems from 
looking at the Islamic Bank from three related 
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perspectives. First; as a financial institution that 
seeks for profitability and increases the wealth of its 
owners and second is also seen as an institution 
aiming to play the social role and support his 
community and finally, it is a financial institution 
aiming to apply Sharia in financial transactions. All 
the three perspectives can be achieved through full 
disclosure about these accountabilities. Any failure 
to disclose any of the three aspects could affect the 
credibility of the Islamic Bank and its image in front 
of its clients and thus its financial position and its 
competitiveness with traditional banks. So, the 
disclosure is the applicable tool for Islamic banks to 
approve for all stakeholders to what extent they 
achieve their accountabilities. 
Therefore, in this research, the accountability 
concept means the responsibilities towards Allah, 
society, stockholders and other stakeholders. In our 
research, we explore these accountabilities for IBs by 
measuring how IBs discloses information that 
concerned with these accountabilities by annual 
reports and websites. The disclosure about IBs’ 
accountabilities contains Sharia, accountability and 
financial accountability. The Sharia disclosure 
accountability means the level of disclosure about 
compliance with Sharia through SSBR as well as 
Sharia compliance indicators in the whole annual 
report sections. The social disclosure is reflected by 
extent to which the banks serve the society as well 
as pay Zakat and Qard Hassan based on CSR and 
social statements in the whole annual report 
sections. Finally; financial disclosure accountability 
means the extent to which the financial statements 
and financial performance reflect all financial 
information for the whole stakeholders 
 
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1. Profitability 
 
Wallace and Naser (1995), Chavent et al. (2006) 
theorized that companies with higher profitability 
provide comparatively more information. A positive 
relationship between corporate profitability and 
level of corporate disclosures is hypothesised in 
different prior research (e.g., Gray et al., 2001; 
Hossain et al., 2006; Othman et al., 2009). Signaling 
theory justifies this positive correlation by the fact 
that corporate boards of highly profitable firms are 
more likely to disclose more information to increase 
stockholders’ confidence and accordingly to raise 
their compensation and to raise capital at the lowest 
cost (Marston & Polei, 2004). Agency theory also 
argues that corporate managers of profitable 
corporations have a motivation to disclose more 
information to increase their compensation (Abd El 
Salam, 1999). For IBs; Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
support the previous debating. They find a positive 
relationship between the firm’s profitability and the 
extent of disclosure in IBs. However, from an Islamic 
perspective, where full disclosure represented an 
accountability towards Allah before stakeholders, 
Haniffa (2002) argues that a corporation should 
provide full disclosure in any situation whether it is 
making a profit or otherwise. Thus, we formulate 
our first hypothesis as follows: 
H
1
: There is no association between profitability 
and levels of corporate accountability disclosure. 
 
3.2. Size 
 
A number of studies have found a positive 
association between firm size and levels of 
disclosures (e.g., Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Hassan 
et al., 2009; Alsaeed, 2006). Related to social 
accountability disclosure research, size was found to 
be a significant factor influencing the level of CSR 
disclosure (Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992). However, 
based on Sharia principles, larger IBs should tend to 
contribute more to the activities of the community, 
in addition, to comply with Sharia in all activities as 
well disclose information about their financial 
performance. Therefore, it may provide additional 
information in the annual reports to discharge their 
accountability to all groups of stakeholders, 
particularly to Allah and for Muslim investors. We 
formulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
H
2
: There is a positive association between firm 
size and levels of corporate accountability disclosure. 
 
3.3. Leverage 
 
Based on the agency theory, Xiao et al. (2004) argue 
that increased disclosure can reduce debt holders’ 
inclinations to price-protect against transfers from 
themselves to stockholders. Debreceny and Rahman 
(2005) find that increases in the debt-equity ratio 
create agency costs. Therefore, corporate managers 
report more voluntary information to assist 
creditors to monitor continually the affairs of the 
corporation and help them evaluate the ability of the 
firm to pay its obligations on time. Managers tend to 
provide more information in order to send a good 
signal to debt holders regarding the corporate ability 
to meet its obligations. Empirical evidence on the 
association between leverage and disclosure is 
mixed. While, Elshandidy (2011), Marshall and 
Weetman (2007), Taylor et al. (2010), Barako et al. 
(2006), Hossain et al. (1994_ found a positive 
relationship, Abraham and Cox (2007), Linsley and 
Shrives (2006), Rajab and Schachler (2009) found 
insignificant association. Our third hypothesis: 
H
3
. Highly gearing IBs are more likely to disclose 
more information about corporate accountability 
Disclosure compared with low Leverage IBs. 
 
3.4. Auditor size 
 
Auditors are a control element whose responsibility 
is to assure the reliability and the validity of 
financial statements (Porter et al., 2008). A number 
of studies supported the theoretical proposition of 
agency theory and signaling theory, that large audit 
firms have a greater quantity of information 
disclosed by their clients than small ones (e.g., Naser 
et al., 1999; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2002; Han et al., 
2012). Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) drew attention to 
the fact that the size of the audit firm can 
significantly affect the amount of information 
disclosed in the financial statements. The largest 
auditing firms motivate their corporations to 
disclose more and comprehensive information than 
required to preserve their reputations (Firth, 1979). 
Hence, the fourth hypothesis of the study: 
H
4
: The extent of levels of corporate 
accountability disclosure in IBs is larger for Banks 
that audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. 
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3.5. Accounting standards (AAOIFI) 
 
Accounting standards are used to produce 
comparable and reliable accounting information to 
support investors, creditors and all stakeholders to 
make investment decisions. The adoption of IFRS 
improves transparency, disclosure and 
comparability (Biddle & Saudagaran, 1989). The 
higher disclosure requirements and financial 
reporting quality that stem from IFRS implies that 
the adoption of IFRS gives a positive indicator to 
investors as information asymmetry and agency 
costs tend to diminish (Tarca, 2004). However, 
Hameed (2001) argues that IFRS is inappropriate for 
IFI because of the uniqueness transactions of IBs. 
Also, IFRSs are not compatible with IBs (Maali & 
Napier, 2010). Therefore, we suppose enhancing 
disclosure level about bank’ accountability in case of 
adopting Islamic standards as AAOIFI. Ariss and 
Sarieddine (2007) argued that the adoption of 
AAOIFI standards by IBs will help to enhance their 
credibility as well as disclosure levels. Besar et al. 
(2009) claim that one of the main tools to enhance 
the Islamic banking industry is adopting Islamic 
standards which can effect on the disclosure and 
transparency levels for IFI. Therefore, the fourth 
hypothesis of the study: 
H
5
: There is a positive association between levels 
of corporate accountability disclosure and adopting 
of AAOIFI. 
 
3.6. Sharia auditing department (SAD) 
 
The literature (e.g., Epstein & Pava, 1993; Hodge, 
2001) specifies that stockholders commonly find 
audited information to be more reliable than 
unaudited information. Mercer (2004) argues that 
the internal auditing department (IAD) ‘serves as the 
first line of defence against disclosure errors”. 
Consequently, IAD is a critical and unique 
governance mechanism that maintains credibility 
and enhancing the disclosure level1. Hence, the 
seventh hypothesis of the study is: 
H
6
: the extent of levels of corporate 
accountability disclosure is positively associated with 
existing SAD inside the IBs. 
 
3.7. Control variables 
 
To address the issues related to the omitted 
correlated variables, our models have a 
comprehensive list of control variables. First, we 
control for age of the bank. Majority of studies 
found an association between firm age and 
disclosure (e.g., Akhtaruddin, 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Rahman et al., 2011). Second, we control for 
ownership. Eng and Mak (2002), Schadewitz and 
Blevins (1998) argue that private companies’ 
disclosure is less transparent because they face less 
market demand for it. Third, we control for the 
                                                          
1 IAD plays a critical role in corporate governance by helping ensure 
financial reporting reliability (Bailey et al., 2003; Gramling et al., 2004; 
Carcello et al., 2005). The extant research literature provides evidence that 
IAD has positive effects on financial reporting and reliability. For example, 
Schneider & Wilner (1990) found that the presence of IAD deters fraudulent 
financial reporting. Archambeault et al. (2008) highlight the need for an 
IAD report to improve governance transparency. Information-seeking 
theory (Wilson, 1997) provides a basis for predicting that existing IAD will 
increase investor perceptions of oversight effectiveness and confidence in 
financial reporting reliability. 
riskiness. Managers may publish more information 
in order to diminish information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders (Elshandidy et al., 
2013). Company with high-risk levels will try to 
increase disclosure to reduce uncertainties among 
stockholders implying a better evaluation of risk by 
market (Hassan, 2009). Fourth, our models have a 
list of variables to control differences between 
countries as our research explores accountabilities 
of IBs across 23 countries. The national culture is an 
institutional factor that influences companies’ 
choices regarding financial reporting and disclosure 
level (Hope, 2003). Hofstede (2001) recommends 4 
dimensions that have been widely used in prior 
accounting research to examine the impact of 
culture on accounting practices and disclosure (e.g., 
Doupnik & Tsakumis, 2004). These dimensions are 
defined in Table 1. Regarding disclosure practices, 
Zarzeski (1996) hypothesises and finds that all of 
Hofstede’s dimensions have a significant impact on 
disclosure. Gray (1988) hypothesized that financial 
disclosures in different countries would be 
influenced negatively by cultural. Wong (2012) 
suggests that uncertainty avoidance is the most 
influential cultural dimensions that may affect 
disclosure. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) argue that 
differences in disclosure levels could be due to 
differences in socio-economic and political 
environments between countries. Hence, we use the 
legal system as one of the control variables. Dobler 
et al. (2011) suggest that the legal system may affect 
disclosure quality and its determinants in common 
and civil law systems or other law (Sharia law). Dong 
and Stettler (2011) find significant impacts of both 
the legal system and cultural values on aggregated 
disclosure. We also control GDP Growth (Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008). We also added other variables to 
our model which are full adoption of AAOIFI from 
central banks as Sudan and Bahrain that make 
AAOIFI mandatory for all Islamic banks; Role of 
central Bank for Sharia supervision as Malaysia 
which has central SSB that control Sharia compliance 
for all Islamic banks; Islamization system; 
Corruption Index and Literacy rate. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This study examines reporting by 117 IBs across 23 
countries based on data from 2016. We explore for 
what extent disclosure of IBs is reflecting the holistic 
accountabilities based on Sharia and AAOIFI 
standard as a benchmark for any IFIs. We explore 
Sharia, social and financial accountabilities in all 
sections that reported in the annual reports as well 
as websites. Thus, our research divided into two 
stages. The first stage of measuring the 
accountability disclosure related to Sharia, social 
and financial in a specific section that reflects these 
accountabilities which are SSBR; CSR and financial 
statement. The second stage is measuring the three 
disclosure accountabilities in all sections in the 
annual report. In this stage, we explore Sharia, social 
and financial disclosure vision and mission; CEO 
statement and strategy report.  
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Table 1. Hofstede model dimensions and scores for our selected countries 
 
Country 
Culture Hofstede dimensions 
Power distance Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty avoidance 
1. UK 35 89 66 35 
2. UAE 90 25 50 80 
3. Pakistan 55 14 50 70 
4. Yemen 85 35 65 66 
5. Egypt 70 25 45 80 
6. Bahrain 87 30 55 75 
7. Qatar 85 45 60 80 
8. Sudan 80 38 53 68 
9. Kuwait 90 25 40 80 
10. Srilanka 80 35 10 45 
11. Jordan 70 30 45 65 
12. Malaysia 100 26 50 36 
13. KSA 95 25 60 80 
14. Thailand 64 20 34 64 
15. Bangladesh 80 20 55 60 
16. Syria 80 35 52 60 
17. Brunei 80 39 52 64 
18. Lebanon 75 40 65 50 
19. Palestine 85 35 65 66 
20. Kenya 70 25 60 50 
21. Oman 85 35 56 66 
22. Iraq 95 30 45 85 
23. Philippine 94 32 64 44 
Notes: Power distance, which is the extent to which power is distributed equally within a society and the degree to which society 
accepts this distribution, from relatively equal to extremely unequal. Individualism, which is the degree to which individuals base their 
actions on self-interest versus the interests of group. Masculinity, which is a measure of a society's goal orientation: a masculine culture 
emphasises status derived from wages and position; a feminine culture emphasises human relations and quality of life. Uncertainty 
avoidance, which is the degree to which individuals in a country prefer structured over unstructured situations, from relatively flexible 
to extremely rigid, to cope with risk and innovation; a low uncertainty culture emphasises a higher level of standardisation. 
Source: Geert Hofstede. (2005). Dimension data matrix. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: https://geerthofstede.com/research-and-
vsm/dimension-data-matrix/
 
Consequently, the study tests 8 models which are 
related to disclosure about SSBR; CSR; financial; 
aggregate; total Sharia; total social; total financial 
and holistic disclosure. For this purpose, the study 
uses content analysis1 to explore if certain themes 
related to Sharia, social and financial accountability 
are present or absent from annual reports and 
websites. Haniffa and Hudaib (2004) state that 
disclosure in annual reports and other media such 
as the websites are key venues for banks to 
demonstrate that their activities are in line with 
Sharia. We conduct a pilot study on a sample of 30 
IBs for 2011-2013. Based on t-test; the finding shows 
insignificant differences between the three years (sig 
0.392 which is < 0.05 for Sharia); (sig 0.367 which is 
< 0.05 for social) and (sig 0.263 which is < 0.05 for 
financial 
 
4.1. Sample selection and data collection 
 
We use Bankers databases for the sample selection 
in addition to central banks for most of the 
countries that provide Islamic banking services at 23 
countries. The chosen banks are selected based on 
banks with 100% compliance with Sharia. Our 
selected banks are chosen also based on the 
availability of the least three annual reports and it 
should be published in Arabic or English. Thus, we 
excluded IBs in Iran (17) and in Turkey (4) as they do 
not have the SSB which represent one of our main  
                                                          
1 The use of content analysis techniques in research into corporate 
disclosure used based on manual scoring (e.g. Santema et al., 2005; Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006). The disclosure index is unweighted and assumes that 
each item of disclosure is equally important (Gray et al., 1995). The 
preference for using the un-weighted approach is to avoid the subjectivity 
involved in assigning the weights of importance to items by different user 
groups (Cooke, 1991; Raffournier, 1995). 
pillars for our accountability framework. We 
excluded subsidiaries from our sample (19) and we 
exclude 13 banks that their annual reports not 
available or it is published in different languages. 
Therefore, we collect data for 117 IBs from 23 
countries namely Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, UAE, Egypt; Yemen; Brunei; 
Lebanon; Iraq; Philippines; Kenya; Palestine; 
Thailand; Srilanka and UK. The variables concerned 
with countries as GDP and legal system are collected 
from the World Bank database and UN database. The 
dimensions related to culture are collected from 
Hofstede Green centre and variables related to firm-
specific characteristics are collected from the annual 
report and banker database. 
 
4.2. Construction disclosure indexes with assessing 
the validity and reliability 
 
Our benchmark for accountability is pragmatic and 
takes into account the different secular effects 
facing IBs. However, this does not prevent them 
from disclosing our suggested items on a voluntary 
basis, even if they are not required by regulation. 
Our benchmark is contracted based on manly 
AAOIFI standards that are related to accounting; 
governance issues and previous studies that explore 
Sharia, social and financial accountability for IBs. As 
AAOIFI is construct based on Sharia. Therefore, the 
compliance level reflects compliance with Sharia 
basics more than compliance with AAOIFI 
requirements. Related to validity and reliability 
issues, we examined the items of the indices and 
decided what that specific item was intended to 
measure (Beattie et al., 2004). We developed the 
dimensions of our SSBR; CSR and financial indices 
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based on standards for IFIs issued by AAOIFI 
(mainly) and the previous literature (secondary) as 
illustrated in Table 2. For testing reliability; the 
preceding studies argues that content analysis is not 
considered reliable if it is conducted only once or 
only by one specific person (Neuendorf, 2002). 
Hence the following procedures were undertaken to 
construct our three indices as well sure about 
validity and reliability issues as follows: First: We 
adopt the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI 
governance standards No. 1; 2 &5 that reflect the 
Sharia accountability based on SSB report and SSB 
members. It also adopts the disclosure requirements 
of AAOIFI financial standards No.1 that focus on the 
presentation and disclosure of financial statements 
that reflect the financial accountability of IBs. 
Finally, we adopt AAOIFI governance standard No.7 
that guide IFI for social accountability based on CSR 
report. The researcher reviews the least available 
edition for AAOIFI, which is 2010 and 2014. Second, 
we made some modifications to the disclosure 
indices based on literature review that measure 
Sharia, social and financial for Islamic banks (see for 
instance Hassan & Harahap, 2010; Farag et al., 2014; 
Aribi & Gao, 2012; Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2007; Mohammed, 2007; Ullah & Jamali, 
2010; Williams & Zinkin, 2010; Rashid et al., 2013; 
Besar et al., 2009; Kamla & Rammal, 2013). We also 
survey the Quran and Sunna to observe the main 
themes for compliance with Sharia accountability 
towards Allah and also for social activities. Based on 
this survey, we get some items that the annual 
report for IFIs should contain and disclose as Zakat 
and Qard Hasan. Third, we review our three indices 
with 3 academics and 3 professionals to enhance the 
validity of the study’s results (This technique is 
supported through Marston and Shrives (1991). 
 
Table 2. Holistic disclosure checklist. Benchmark for Islamic accountability of Islamic banks (Part I) 
 
 Main Dimensions  Sources 
Sharia Index 
S
h
a
ri
a
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 i
n
d
e
x
 
Names of Sharia board members 
T
o
ta
l 
 I
te
m
s 
2
0
 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Rashid et al., 
2013; AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Brief about each members in the Sharia board 
(Background and qualifications)  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Ghayad, 2008; Hassan and Harahap, 
2010; Aribi and Gao, 2012; AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Numbers of board members Maali et al., 2006 
Pictures of the board members Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Rashid et al., 2013 
The administration position for the Sharia board in 
the organization structure  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007 
The role and responsibilities of the board IFSB, 2006, Ghayad, 2008; AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010 
The authorities of the board AAOIFI, 2014; Ghayad, 2008; Vinnicombe, 2010 
The Sharia auditing department in the bank AAOIFI, 2014; IFSB, 2006; Shafiia et al., 2014; Besar et al., 2009 
The account of board’s meeting 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Rashid et al., 
2013 
Is the website or annual report disclose the Fatwas for 
the Sharia board related to Islamic services  
Aribi and Gao, 2012; AAOIFI, 2014 
Is the website disclose the board’s role for spreading 
the awareness about the Islamic banking thoughts  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010 
SSB report assigned from the board members 
Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Rashid 
et al., 2013; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013  
Information about the bank’s responsibilities of Zakat  
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Farook 
et al., 2011; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
Information about the bank’s responsibilities of  
activities not comply with Sharia and how the bank 
deal with it 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et 
al., 2003; Sofyan, 2003; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
Information about how profit distribution process in 
the bank comply with Islamic Sharia  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Sofyan, 2003; Hassan and 
Harahap, 2010; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
Information about the independency of the Sharia 
board with charter shows the objectivity of the board 
AAOIFI, 2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Information about opinion for the board about 
completely compliance of the bank with the rules of 
Islamic Sharia 
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et 
al., 2003; Aribi and Gao, 2012; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
The board discloses its opinion after reviewing all 
documents and all financial statements for the bank 
AAOIFI, 2014; Rashid et al., 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi 
and Gao, 2012 
Is the report shows that the bank comply with the 
AAOIFI’s standards 
AAOIFI, 2014 
Information about the date of report  and name of 
bank  
AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
Social Index 
S
o
ci
a
l 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 i
n
d
e
x
 
Employee welfare  
T
o
ta
l 
 I
te
m
s 
9
5
 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; Hassan 
and Harahap, 2010; Farook et al., 2011; Farook, 2007; Rashid et al., 
2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Internal  environment preservation policy  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla 
and Rammal, 2013;  Maali et al., 2003; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; 
Farook et al., 2011; Farook, 2007 
Earning and expenditure prohibited by Sharia AAOIFI, 2014; Farook, 2007; Rashid et al., 2013 
Par Excellence customers services   AAOIFI, 2014; Farook, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Late repayments and insolvent clients and avoiding 
onerous terms  
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et 
al., 2003; Farook et al., 2011; Rashid et al., 2013 
Qard Hassan  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; 
Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Farook, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Micro and small business and social saving and 
investments and Development   
AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Farook, 2007 
Screening and informing clients for compliance with 
Islamic principles 
 AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Farook, 2007; Aribi and 
Gao, 2012 
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Table 2. Holistic disclosure checklist. Benchmark for Islamic accountability of Islamic banks (Part II) 
 
 Main Dimensions  Sources 
Sharia Index 
S
o
ci
a
l 
d
is
c
lo
su
re
 i
n
d
e
x
 
Zakat  
T
o
ta
l 
It
e
m
s 
9
5
 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006;  AAOIFI, 2014; 
Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Maali et al., 2003; Farook et al., 
2011; Farook, 2007; Rashid et al., 2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012; 
Vinnicombe, 2010 
Charitable activates  
Belal, 2001; Maali, et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007;  
AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Hassan and Harahap, 
2010; Farook et al., 2011; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Waqf management AAOIFI, 2014; Farook, 2007 
Social responsibility 
OECD, 2011; AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Maali et 
al., 2003; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Farook, 2007; Aribi and 
Gao, 2012 
Financial Index 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 i
n
d
e
x
 
Comparative financial statements  
T
o
ta
l 
It
e
m
s 
1
1
4
 
IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Basic information about  the bank  IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014; Sofyan, 2003 
Disclosure of the currency used for accounting 
measurement   
IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of significant accounting policies IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of earning or expenditure prohibited 
by Sharia 
AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; Sofyan, 2003; Farook et al., 
2011 
Disclosure about assets and liabilities’ risk  IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of contingences IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of accounting policy changes  IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Presentation and disclosure in the Financial 
Position  
IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Presentation and disclosure in the Income 
Statement 
IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure in the statement of Cash Flows IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity   IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments   AAOIFI, 2014; Sofyan, 2003 
Disclosure in the Statement of Sources and Uses 
of funds of  Zakat and Sadakat  
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; Sofyan, 2003; 
Aribi and Gao, 2012; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Disclosure in the statemen  of sources and uses 
of funds, Loan Fund (Qard Hassan Fund)  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; 
Sofyan, 2003; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
 
4.3. Research models 
 
To empirically investigate the relationship between 
accountability pillars (Sharia, social; financial and 
aggregate) and firm-specific characteristics, we use 
the following OLS regressions: 
Panel A: The dependent variable in the 
following model is focused on the specific indices, 
which are SSB; CSR; Financial statements and 
aggregate disclosure as follows: 
Model 1: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽12𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽18𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽20𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒 
(1) 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable focuses on the 
all sections in the annual report and Websites. 
Consequently, it contains Sharia, social financial and 
holistic in all sections which are vision; mission; CEO 
statement; Management report; strategy report and 
governance report in additional to CSR; SSBR and 
financial statements. 
Model 2: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽12𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽18𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽20𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒 
(2) 
 
Where DISCLOSE
it
 
 
is the disclosure provided by 
Disclosure Indices, which measures the level of 
disclosure of SSBR (1); CSR (2); financial statements 
(3); aggregate (4). Where Total DISCLOSES
it
 is the 
disclosure provided by Disclosure Indices, which 
measures total Sharia disclosure (5); Total social 
disclosure (6); Total financial disclosure (7) and 
Holistic aggregate (8) in Islamic bank i at year t 
(2013). All variables are described in Table 3. The 
disclosure score for each accountability level is 
calculated as a ratio of the total items disclosed to 
20 (maximum score for Sharia) for model 1, 114 
(maximum score for financial) for model 2, 95 
(maximum score for social) for model 3 and 229 
(maximum score for aggregate disclosure) for model 
4,20 items plus any words or sentences related to 
Sharia for model 5, 95 items plus any words or 
sentences related to social for model 6, 114 items 
plus any words or sentences related to financial for 
model 7, 229 items plus any words or sentences 
related to Sharia, social and financial for model 8. 
 
5. DISCLOSURE LEVELS WITH ACCOUNTABILITY’ 
PILLARS INDICES 
 
Table 4 shows the average disclosure level for SSBR. 
It shows that average disclosure level 5 is 53%, which 
deviates from our expectations that assume that IBs 
should disclose information about compliance with 
Sharia. The table indicates that the disclosure about 
names of SSBM is higher than any other item (74%). 
The table also shows the lowest item is the 
information about the independence of SSB (10%). 
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The report also states that 58% of selected banks 
disclose information about SSBR. The table also 
shows that only 25% of selected banks disclose 
information about fatwas (Sharia opinions) which 
issued by SSB as a signal for all stakeholders that the 
whole bank activities consistent with Sharia. The 
table shows that only 31% have internal Sharia 
auditing department. Our result (53%) is consistent 
with Hassan and Harahap (2010) who found that the 
average disclosure for banks related to SSB was 53%. 
But 53% is not consistent with other studies that 
conclude high disclosure about Sharia as 
Vinnicombe (2010) who finds a high level of 
disclosure (90 %) with SSB requirements. Aribi and 
Gao (2012) concluded that SSB disclosure is more 
than 90% for 21 IFIs. We notice that the average 
index scores indicate that Syria has the highest score 
of 78% followed by Palestine and Jordan 70% and 
68% respectively. 
 
Table 3. Models specification and variables measurements 
 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Variable description 
Predicted 
sign 
Data source 
Dependent variable 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡  
Disclosure 
level 
Sharia disclosure accountability level based on SSB report 
 
Annual reports and 
Website based on 
indices related to 
AAOIFI standards 
requirements 
 
Social disclosure accountability level based on CSR report 
Financial disclosure accountability level based on FS and 
footnotes 
Total disclosure accountability level based on SSB; CSR and 
FS 
Sharia disclosure accountability based on all annual report’s 
sections 
Social disclosure accountability based on all annual report’s 
sections 
Financial disclosure accountability based on all annual 
report’s sections 
Total disclosure accountability based on all annual report’s 
sections 
The annual report sections contain 5 sections which are: Vision; Mission; Values and Objectives; Chairman’ Statement and CEO’ 
Statement; Directors’ Report; Strategy Report and Corporate Governance Report 
Firm-level independent variables 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 Standards 
1=Bank that use AAOIFI; 0=Bank that use IFRS or Local 
standards 
+ Annual report 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖𝑡 Auditor 
1=Bank’s financial statements were audited by Big 4 auditor; 
0=Bank’s financial statements were not audited by Big 4 
auditor 
+ Annual report 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 Size The natural log of total assets + Annual report 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 Profitability Return on assets (ROA)
3 + 
Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 Leverage Total liabilities (Debts)/Total assets + 
Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 
Sharia 
Auditing 
department 
1=Bank that has Sharia auditing department; 0=Bank that 
has not Sharia auditing department 
+ Annual report 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 Ownership 
1= Publicly-held Islamic bank; 0= Privately-owned Islamic 
bank 
+ Annual report 
Control variables related to country 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 
Risk 
Adequacy 
Tier 1 capital 
 
Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 Ownership 1= public Islamic banks; otherwise=0 Annual report 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 Age Age of bank from the foundation date Annual report 
𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 
𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 
𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 
Hofstede 
Culture 
dimensions 
Power distance 
Individualism 
Masculinity 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Hofstede green 
centre database 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 
Country 
legal 
System 
1 = Sharia Law; 0 = Other non-Sharia Law (e.g. Civil Law, 
Common Law, or Hybrid Law) 
World Bank 
Database 
𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 
Full 
adoption 
for AAOIFI 
1 = Full adoption of AAOIFI; 0 = Not full adoption of AAOIFI Central banks 
𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 
Role of 
central 
Bank for 
SSB 
1 = Countries where the central bank has Central SSB; 0 = 
Countries where the central bank doesn't have Central SSB 
Central banks 
𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡 
Islamization 
system 
1 = Complete Islamic banking system; 0 = Non-complete 
Islamic banking system 
World Bank 
Database 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 GDP GDP growth rate 
World Bank 
Database 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 
Corruption 
Index 
% of Corruption level for each county 
World Bank 
Database 
Notes: 3Consistent with prior studies, this study uses return on asset (ROA) to proxy for the profitability of IFIs as it better reflects 
performance (Debreceny & Rahman, 2005). 
 
Table 5 shows that the average disclosure level 
of CSR index is 28%. We find that the social 
responsibility in screening its investments 
dimension generally scores highly across all banks 
whilst the social responsibility in its relationship 
with customers and clients generally scores the 
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lowest. The highest disclosure score related to whole 
CSR index is Charitable activates which is 44%. The 
lowest disclosure scores are Waqf management and 
late repayments in additional to Qard Hassan (1%; 1% 
and 8% respectively). Overall, Table 5 shows low 
disclosure level related to CSR (28%). This finding is 
consistent with studies that found low disclosure 
level about CSR (e.g., Hasan, 2008 (23%); Farook et 
al., 2011 (17%); Abdul Rahman et al., 2010 (8%); Maali 
et al., 2006 (13%). Also our result (28%) is low 
compared to other studies that find CSR disclosure 
is high in IBs (e.g., Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013 
(83%); Hassan et al., 2012 (49%); Farag et al., 2014 
(44%)). The average index scores indicate that Jordan 
has the highest score of 47%, followed by 
Bangladesh and Kuwait 43% and 38% respectively. 
Iraq and Philippine (15% and 16% respectively) are 
the countries with the lowest scores. 
 
Table 4. Compliance level based on SSBR index 
 
Items related to SSB members % * 
1 Names of Sharia board members 74% 
2 Brief about each members in the board 35% 
3 Numbers of board members 47% 
4 Pictures of the board members 25% 
5 The administration position for the board in the organization structure  37% 
6 The role and responsibilities of the board 53% 
7 The authorities of the board 63% 
8 The Sharia auditing department in the bank 39% 
9 The account of board’s meeting 17% 
10 Is the website for the bank contain the Fatwas for the Sharia board related to Islamic services  25% 
11 Is the website disclose the board’s role for spreading the awareness about the Islamic banking thoughts  40% 
Items related to SSB report %* 
1 The SSB report assigned from the board members 58% 
2 Information about the bank’s responsibilities of Zakat  49% 
3 Information about the bank’s responsibilities of  activities not comply with Sharia and how the bank deal with it  42% 
4 Information about how profit distribution process in the bank comply with Islamic Sharia  48% 
5 Information about the independency of the Sharia board with charter shows the objectivity of the board 10% 
6 Information about opinion for the board about completely compliance of the bank with the rules of Islamic Sharia 62% 
7 The board discloses its opinion after reviewing all documents and all financial statements for the bank 60% 
8 Is the report shows that the bank comply with the AAOIFI’s Sharia standards 13% 
9 Information about the date of report (Period covered) and name of bank  58% 
Average disclosure for SSBR  53% 
Notes: * The un-weighted approach attaches equal weights to all disclosed items within the checklist. Therefore, if the item 
disclosed in the annual report it takes "1" otherwise it takes "0". The disclosure score for each accountability level calculated as a ratio 
of the total items disclosed to 20. The level of disclosure (%) is measured for each bank as the ratio of the score obtained to the 
maximum possible score (20) relevant for that company (this methodology was first proposed by Cooke (1989). 
 
Table 5. The compliance level based on CSR index 
 
 
Table 6 shows full disclosure about Financial 
Position statement and Income Statement (100%) and 
very high levels of disclosure about Statement of 
Cash Flows 98% and 88% related to Statement of 
Changes in the Owner's Equity. However, the table 
shows low disclosure level about other statements, 
which are related to Islamic identification that 
includes a statement of Zakat; Qard Hassan and 
changes in Restricted Investments (11%; 8% and 4% 
respectively). We notice that Yemen has the highest 
score of 83% followed by Syria and UAE at 70% and 
69% respectively. The average score indicates that 
Lebanon and Philippine (49% for both) are the 
countries with the lowest score. 
Table 7 illustrates the descriptive statistics of 
accountability indices scores across 23 counties in 
addition to the aggregate disclosure that contains all 
sections in the annual report. Figure 1 shows the top 
10 countries based on the disclosure levels. 
 
 
 
Dimensions of Holistic Islamic CSR Disclosure % 
A. Social responsibility within the organization   28% 
A1. Employee welfare 33% 
A2. Internal  environment preservation policy  26% 
A3. Earning and expenditure prohibited by Sharia 26% 
B. Social responsibility in its relationship with customers and clients   16% 
B4.Par Excellence customers services   40% 
B5.Late repayments and insolvent clients and avoiding onerous terms  1% 
B6. Qard Hassan  8% 
C. Social responsibility in screening its investments   43% 
C7. Micro and small business and social saving and investments and 
Development 
40% 
C8. Screening and informing clients for compliance with Islamic principles 34% 
D. Social responsibility in its relationship with greater society  27% 
D9. Zakat  26% 
D10. Charitable activates  44% 
D11. Waqf management 1% 
D12. Social responsibility 35% 
Average over all disclosure level 28% 
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Table 6. Compliance level based on financial index 
 
Footnotes  % 
Comparative financial statements  100% 
Basic information about  the bank  100% 
Disclosure of the currency used for accounting measurement   100% 
Disclosure of significant accounting policies 80% 
Disclosure of earning or expenditure prohibited by sharia  14% 
Disclosure about assets and liabilities’ risk  65% 
Disclosure of contingences  30% 
Disclosure of accounting policy changes  50% 
Financial statements  % 
Presentation and disclosure in the Financial Position  100% 
Presentation and disclosure in the profit and loss account  100% 
Disclosure in the statement of Cash Flows 98% 
Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity   88% 
Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments   11% 
Disclosure in the Statement of Sources and Uses of funds of  Zakat and Sadakat 8% 
Disclosure in the statement  of sources and uses of funds, Loan Fund (Qard Hassan Fund) 4% 
Average over all disclosure level 62% 
 
Table 7. Final disclosure levels for countries related to accountability pillars  
 
Country 
No of 
banks 
Group A: Disclosure for SSB; CSR and Financial Group B: Holistic Disclosure (Aggregate) 
SSBR 
Index 
CSR 
Index 
Financial 
Index 
Average Sharia Social Financial 
Holistic 
Average 
UK 4 47% 19% 57% 41% 39% 20% 79% 46% 
UAE 8 52% 21% 69% 47% 39% 28% 85% 50% 
Pakistan 9 65% 31% 66% 54% 53% 34% 83% 56% 
Yemen 3 55% 20% 83% 53% 35% 17% 92% 48% 
Egypt 2 45% 29% 60% 45% 38% 24% 80% 48% 
Bahrain 15 62% 22% 63% 49% 48% 22% 82% 51% 
Qatar 6 52% 20% 66% 46% 37% 20% 83% 47% 
Sudan 11 45% 21% 66% 44% 25% 23% 83% 44% 
Kuwait 5 54% 38% 63% 52% 37% 27% 82% 49% 
Srilanka 1 65% 43% 49% 52% 53% 52% 75% 60% 
Jordan 4 68% 47% 68% 61% 54% 39% 84% 59% 
Malaysia 16 51 % 33% 62% 49% 38 % 24 % 81% 47 % 
KSA 5 43% 31% 66% 47% 49% 33% 83% 55% 
Thailand 1 40% 45% 52% 46% 60% 53% 76% 63% 
Bangladesh 9 59% 43% 66% 56% 50% 48% 83% 60% 
Syria 2 78% 22% 70% 57% 59% 16% 85% 54% 
Brunei 1 60% 38% 63% 54% 30% 19% 82% 44% 
Lebanon 2 38% 21% 49% 36% 29% 10% 75% 38% 
Palestine 2 70% 42% 69% 59% 55% 46% 85% 62% 
Kenya 2 43% 20% 54% 39% 32% 15% 78% 42% 
Oman 3 60% 20% 57% 46% 43% 33% 79% 52% 
Iraq 5 19% 15% 53% 29% 24% 22% 77% 41% 
Philippine 1 10% 16% 49% 25% 15% 28% 75% 39% 
Average 117 53% 28% 62% 48% 41% 28% 81% 50% 
 
Figure 1. Islamic accountability disclosure pillars across top 10 countries  
 
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
UAE * Pakistan * Bahrain * Qatar * Sudan * Kuwait * Malaysia * KSA * Bangladesh
*
Iraq *
SSBR CSR Financial Sharia Social Financial
Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions/ Volume 8, Issue 3, 2018 
 
33 
Table 8 summarizes the disclosure level for the 
main five sections in the annual report that measure 
the extent to which the three Islamic accountability 
pillars are reflected. These sections comprise vision, 
mission and objectives; CEO statement; directs’ 
report; strategy report and finally, CG report. 
Regarding vision, mission and objectives, 75% of our 
selected banks disclose information about Sharia 
accountability in their vision and mission; 45% about 
social accountability. Finally, it shows 100% missions 
and objectives are related to financial issues as high 
return and enhancing services. The other sections in 
the annual report as CEO statement and CG report 
indicate high disclosure levels about financial 
accountability and low levels related to Sharia and 
social accountabilities. The table also shows that 
vision and mission is the highest section in the 
disclosure level (73%) than CG report and followed 
by CEO statement (62% and 56% respectively). 
Hence, we present two groups from selected IBs 
to show extent to which vision and mission reflect 
Sharia, social and financial accountability. The first 
group shows high reflectance of Sharia, social and 
financial accountability in their vision and mission. 
First National bank Modaraba in Pakistan stated in 
the mission that “The fundamental Mission is to 
seek the pleasure of Allah” and also mentioned, 
“Our main aim is attaining the rights of Allah”. Al-
Arafah Islamic bank in Bangladesh stated that 
“Achieving the satisfaction of Almighty Allah both 
here & hereafter is one of the main objectives”. 
Social Islamic bank in Bangladesh stated two 
objectives, which ensure best CSR practices and 
ensure Green Banking. The second group indicates a 
sample from IBs’ vision and mission that does not 
reflect Sharia and social accountabilities. All banks 
reflect financial accountability as Alliance Islamic 
Bank at Malaysia, which focus on customer services 
as the main vision and build sustainable financial 
performance as the main mission. Islamic bank of 
Britain mentioned that “Our Vision is to be the UK’s 
first choice Islamic bank”. Abu Dhabi Islamic bank 
states that “To become a top-tier regional bank”. 
This Vision does not contain any guide for bank’s 
Sharia and social accountability. Bahrain Islamic 
Bank shows the extent to which Islamic bank ignore 
the state of its accountability in their vision and 
mission, defined as follows “To leverage our core 
competencies of customer intimacy, service, 
leadership and product innovation, in order to 
exceed the expectations of our stakeholders”. 
Table 9-1 shows examples for IBs that reflects low 
orientation towards the three accountabilities in 
their vision and mission. Table 9-2 presents 
examples of banks that have highly refection about 
Sharia social and financial accountability in the 
vision and mission. 
 
Table 8. Disclosure levels for all sections in the annual report 
 
 Sharia 
accountability 
Social 
accountability 
Financial 
accountability 
Average 
Vision; Mission; Values and Objectives 75% 45% 100% 73% 
Chairman’ Statement and CEO’ Statement  30% 38% 100% 56% 
Directors’ Report 25 % 22% 100% 49% 
Strategy Report 20 % 35% 100% 52% 
Corporate Governance Report 45% 40% 100% 62% 
Average  31% 28% 100% 53% 
 
Table 9-1. Examples for IBs that reflect low disclosure about Islamic accountability 
 
Bank Vision Mission 
Alliance Islamic 
Bank, Malaysia4 
The best customer services bank  
To Build: Sustainable and Consistent Financial Performance; To 
Deliver: Superior Customer Experience and To deliver: Engaged 
Employees With The Right Values 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank, UAE5 
To become a top tier regional bank Islamic financial solutions for everyone 
Bahrain Islamic 
Bank, Bahrain6 
To be the best Sharia-compliant 
financial solutions provider 
To leverage our core competencies of customer intimacy, service, 
leadership and product innovation, in order to exceed the 
expectations of our stakeholders 
Bank Alkhair, 
Bahrain7 
To be a leading global provider of 
Sharia-compliant financial services 
- 
Notes: 4 http://www.allianceislamicbank.com.my/VisionMissionValues 
5 http://www.adib.ae/mission-objectives 
6 http://bisb.com/en/who-we-are/corporate-profile.html 
7 http://www.bankalkhair.com/ 
 
Table 9-2. Examples for IBs that reflect high disclosure about Islamic accountability (Part I) 
 
Bank Vision Mission 
First 
National 
Bank 
Modaraba, 
Pakistan8 
Preserve to replace Riba driven instruments with Islamic 
modes of financing in a manner to achieve optimum 
customer satisfaction by developing relationship. To be 
an institution of excellence, which will create and maintain 
an environment of state-of-art management system and a 
high standard of integrity efficiency professionalism and 
innovation. Attain the status of most professionally and 
profitability. Run Modaraba among its competitors. It shall 
place a special emphasis on human resources development, 
dignity, and security, welfare of people who operate and 
work for the Modaraba. 
The fundamental Mission is to seek the pleasure of 
Allah through making humble contribution in the 
transformation of our mercantile and financial 
system and business in accordance with the 
principles enshrined in the sharia commitments to 
provide Riba free investment and financing 
opportunities to the investors, the business 
community and industry in all business dealings of 
Modaraba, the rights of Allah, the rights of all 
certificate holders and all other rights shall be 
sincerely safeguarded. 
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Table 9-2. Examples for IBs that reflect high disclosure about Islamic accountability (Part II) 
 
Bank Vision Mission 
Al-Arafah 
Islamic bank, 
Bangladesh9 
To be a pioneer in Islamic Banking in Bangladesh and 
contribute significantly to the growth of the national 
economy. 
 Achieving the satisfaction of Almighty Allah both 
here and hereafter. 
 Proliferation of Sharia Based Banking Practices. 
 Fast and efficient customer service; Maintaining 
high standard of business ethics. 
 Steady and competitive return on shareholders' 
equity; Innovative banking at a competitive price. 
 Firm commitment to the growth of national 
economy; Involving more in Micro and SME. 
Social Islamic 
bank limited, 
Bangladesh10 
Working together for a caring society. 
 Fast, accurate and satisfactory customer service; 
Optimum return on shareholders’ equity. 
 Introducing innovative Islamic Banking Products; 
Attract and retain high quality human resources. 
 Empowering real poor families and creating local 
income opportunities. 
 Providing support for social benefits 
organizations by way of social services. 
CIHAN Bank 
for Islamic 
Investment 
and Finance, 
Iraq11 
To be a leading financial institution that provides fully-
fledged banking services compliant with Sharia to 
contribute in the development of the society. 
To translate Islamic financial principles into 
practical solutions that serve the human 
community. 
Arab Islamic 
Bank, 
Palestine12 
The Bank works to establish the principle of dealing 
with the Islamic banking system as a first option for 
dealing bank. It takes an active role in the advancement 
of the Islamic economic system to achieve the principle 
of solidarity and Social objectives. The Islamic Bank is 
committed to providing solutions and modern Islamic 
banking services with High quality and continuing to 
market and deepen the principles of Islamic economics 
locally and internationally. 
 
Qatar Islamic 
Bank, Qatar13 
A leading, innovative and global Islamic bank adhering 
to the highest Sharia and ethical principles; meeting 
international banking standards; partnering the 
development of the global economy and participating in 
the advancement of the society. 
 To provide innovative Sharia-compliant financial 
solutions and quality services to our customers. 
 To maximize returns for our shareholders and 
partners. 
 To nurture an internal environment of qualified 
professionals and cutting-edge technology. 
Notes: 8 http://www.nbmodaraba.com/pg/?pid=2 
9 http://www.al-arafahbank.com/profile.php 
10 http://www.siblbd.com/home/vision 
11 http://www.cihanbank.com/lang/en/Vision_and_mission.aspx 
12 http://www.aibnk.com/post/en/238/overview/22 
13 http://www.qib.com.qa/en/footer/about-us/mission-vision-values.aspx 
 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
 
Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics of 8 
models scores. It shows that the average disclosure 
level for SSBR is 53% and 42% related to Sharia 
disclosure level in all sections in the annual report. 
This result is out of our expectations regarding 
corporations raise the flag of Islam and compliance 
with Sharia as the main basis for its activities (e.g., 
El-Gamal, 2006; Kuran, 2004; Visser, 2009). Related 
to CSRD, the disclosure level is 28% and for social 
disclosure in the annual report is 28% which is 
relatively low. Concerned with financial disclosure, 
the compliance level about financial accountability 
in the financial statements is 63% and disclosure for 
financial in all sections in the annual report is 82% 
which is relativity high. 37% of our selected banks 
adopted AAOIFI and 61% audited by the big 4 
auditors. The average age for our banks is 19 years. 
Table 10 also reports that the average leverage ratio 
is 72% whereas the risk adequacy is 29%. The % of 
public banks is 78.6%. 60% has SAD and 37% of our 
selected banks adopting AAOIFI more than IFRS. 60% 
from selected banks auditing from 4 big firms and 
79% of our selected banks are public. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables (Part I) 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
SSBR 117 0.00 0.90 0.5316 0.215 -0.601 -3.001 
CSRD 117 0.08 0.60 0.2761 0.128 0.615 -2.844 
FIN 117 0.46 0.86 0.6256 0.078 0.038 -2.044 
TOTAL 117 0.22 0.70 0.4775 0.108 -0.145 -2.276 
SHARIA .T 117 0.00 0.93 0.4168 0.184 0.303 2.392 
SOCAIL.T 117 0.04 0.68 0.2762 0.159 0.794 -2.236 
FIN.T 117 0.73 0.93 0.8162 0.039 0.023 -2.152 
TOTAL.T 117 0.30 0.81 0.5021 0.100 0.719 2.845 
Standards 117 0.00 1 0.37 0.484 0.557 -3.720 
Auditor 117 0.00 1 0.61 0.491 -0.443 -3.835 
Age 117 2 54 18.80 12.056 0.712 -2.441 
Size 117 1.18 4.87 3.0886 0.807 -0.130 -2.439 
Profitability 117 -13.39 21.57 1.0553 3.467 0.915 2.166 
Risk Adequacy 117 -0.38 1.73 0.2940 0.278 0.348 3.467 
Leverage 117 0.02 0.98 0.7279 0.259 -0.394 2.723 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables (Part II) 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
SAD 117 0.00 1 0.60 0.492 -0.406 -2.867 
Ownership 117 0.00 1 0.79 0.412 -1.415 2.003 
Power distance 117 35 100 82.42 14.84 -0.383 2.073 
Individualism 117 14 89 30.71 13.320 0.810 2.577 
Masculinity 117 34 66 52.91 6.567 0.013 2.157 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
117 35 85 64.49 15.904 -0.804 -2.632 
GDP per capita 117 0.00 1.00 0.0342 0.182 0.194 3.409 
Corruption 117 -6.00 7.30 3.6128 3.463 -0.000 3.028 
Country legal 
System 
117 1 8 4.01 1.808 0.012 -2.251 
Role of Central 
Bank 
117 0 1 0.68 0.467 -0.801 -2.383 
Full adopting 
AAOIFI 
117 0 1 0.30 0.460 0.889 -2.231 
Literacy Rate 117 0.00 1.00 0.3248 0.470 0.758 -2.450 
Islamization 
system 
117 0 1 0.77 0.166 -0.864 -2.640 
Notes: Sharia Supervisor Board Report index; CSR Index: Corporate Social Responsibility Index; Financial Index: Financial 
Statements Index; Total Index: Total disclosure (SSBR; CSR and Financial) Index; Total Sharia  Index: Total Sharia  disclosure for annual 
report Index; Total Social Index: Total social disclosure for annual report Index; Total Financial Index: Total financial disclosure for 
annual report Index; Holistic Index: Holistic disclosure (Sharia, social and financial) Index; Standard: Financial standard (AAOIFI or 
IFRS) (1 if the bank is adopted AAOIFI and 0 otherwise); Size Auditor: Size of auditor (Big-4 firms) (1 if the bank is audited by one of the 
big-4 firms and 0 otherwise); Age: bank age since foundation; B. Size: Bank size (natural logarithm of bank’s total assets in US$ as a 
proxy for bank size); ROA: Return of Asset (Profitability); Riskiness: Risk adequacy (Tier 1 Capital); Leverage: Gearing (TD/TA); Sharia  
Department: Existing Sharia  department ((1 if the bank has Sharia  auditing department inside the bank and 0 otherwise)); 
Ownership: Public or Private Ownership (1 if the bank is Public and 0 otherwise); Hofstede Model for culture (Power distance; 
Individualism; Masculinity and Uncertainty avoidance); GDP: GDP growth (natural logarithm of the gross domestic product of country i 
as a proxy for country macroeconomic factors); Corruption: Corruption perception index; Legal: Country legal system  (1 if the bank in 
country that adopted Sharia  law and 0 otherwise as common and code); Central Bank: Role of central bank for SSB and Social (1 if the 
bank on country that central bank has SSB and 0 otherwise); Full adoption: Full adoption of country for AAOIFI (1 if the bank in 
country adopt AAOIFI for all banks and 0 otherwise); Literacy: Literacy rate for country; System: Complete Islamization banking 
country system (1 if the bank in a full Islamization banking system country and 0 otherwise). 
 
6.2. Pearson correlations matrix 
 
Tables 11 and 12 report the outputs of the 
correlation matrix. Table 11 shows that the 
accounting standard is positive significant with 
financial models (3 & 7), whereas the size of the 
bank is a significant association with all models 
except model 1 related to SSBR. The Table also 
shows that SAD is positive significant for 7 models 
except model 6 related to total social. Related to 
culture, Table 12 shows that individualism is the 
most associated demission from Hofstede model by 
negative association and legal system has a positive 
association related to models 1; 2; 3; 4 and 7. 
 
Table 11. Correlation matrix for firm-specific characteristics 
 
Model 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝒊 𝑨𝑼𝑫𝒊 𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊 𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑲𝒊 𝑳𝑬𝑽𝒊 𝑺𝑫𝑬𝑷𝒊 𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊 
Model 1 0.169 0.187* 0.028 0.131 0.037 0.068 -0.027 0.558** 0.193* 
Model 2 -0.220* 0.100 0.219* 0.418** -0.121 -0.175 0.394** 0.199* 0.185* 
Model 3 0.306** 0.095 0.221* 0.363** 0.003 -0.200* 0.189* 0.330** 0.045 
Model 4 0.094 0.185* 0.161 0.346** -0.011 -0.069 0.189* 0.532** 0.212* 
Model 5 0.029 0.164 0.045 0.215* -0.023 0.062 0.044 0.497** 0.127 
Model 6 -0.162 -0.085 0.220* 0.186* -0.090 -0.184* 0.259** 0.093 0.145 
Model 7 0.280** 0.070 0.245** 0.323** 0.035 -0.198* 0.145 0.356** -0.018 
Model 8 -0.034 0.070 0.177 0.276** -0.062 -0.088 0.192* 0.402** 0.161 
 
Table 12. Correlation matrix for country-specific characteristics 
 
Model 𝑷𝑶𝑾𝒊 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒊 𝑴𝑨𝑺𝒊 𝑼𝑵𝑪𝒊 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊 𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑹𝒊 𝑳𝑬𝑮𝒊 𝑪𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒊 𝑨𝑫𝑶𝑷𝑻𝒊 𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒊 𝑺𝒀𝑺𝒊 
Model 1 -0.127 -0.110 -0.001 -0.001 0.132 0.082 0.278** 0.152 0.134 -0.048 0.030 
Model 2 0.007 -0.310** -0.286** -0.174 0.187* -0.102 0.216* 0.024 -0.190* -0.089 -0.086 
Model 3 0.053 -0.114 0.090 0.160 -0.110 -0.074 0.288** 0.214* 0.174 -0.248** 0.136 
Model 4 -0.069 -0.223* -0.097 -0.038 0.131 -0.007 0.341** 0.161 0.053 -0.127 0.020 
Model 5 -0.126 -0.167 -0.059 0.067 0.294** 0.100 0.145 0.009 0.007 -0.002 -0.096 
Model 6 -0.068 -0.245** -0.167 0.054 0.163 -0.122 0.097 -0.051 -0.166 -0.222* 0.002 
Model 7 0.007 -0.142 0.083 0.165 -0.088 -0.091 0.299** 0.223* 0.150 -0.280** 0.188* 
Model 8 -0.123 -0.235* -0.110 0.078 0.249** -0.010 0.180 0.005 -0.068 -0.150 -0.032 
Notes: Model 1: Sharia Supervisor Board Report index; Model 2: Corporate Social Responsibility Index; Model 3: Financial 
Statements Index; Model 4: Total disclosure (SSBR; CSR and Financial) Index; Model5: Total Sharia disclosure for annual report Index; 
Model 6: Total social disclosure for annual report Index; Model: Total financial disclosure for annual report Index; Model8: Holistic 
disclosure (Sharia, social and financial) Index; 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖: Financial standard (AAOIFI or IFRS); 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖: Size of auditor (Big-4 firms); 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖:bank 
age since foundation; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖: Bank size (natural logarithm of bank’s total assets in US$ as a proxy for bank size); 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖: Return of Asset 
(Profitability); 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖: Risk adequacy (Tier 1 Capital); 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 : Gearing (TD/TA); 𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖: Existing Sharia department; 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖: Public or Private 
Ownership; Hofstede Model for culture (Power distance: 𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖 ; Individualism: 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖; Masculinity: 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑖  and Uncertainty 
avoidance: 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑖); 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖: GDP growth (natural logarithm of the gross domestic product of country i as a proxy for country 
macroeconomic factors); 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖: Corruption perception index; 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝑖: Country legal system (Sharia law and other as common and code); 
𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖: Role of central bank for SSB and Social; 𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑖: Full adoption of country for AAOIFI; 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑖: Literacy rate for country; 𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑖: 
Complete Islamization banking country system ; *p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001. 
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6.3. Regression analysis 
 
Table 13 presents the outputs of regression analysis. 
Related to model 1 (SSBR); the table shows, as 
expected, significant and positive coefficients of 
SAD with disclosure about Sharia (β = 0.581 at the 
1% level). Model 2 (CSRR) reports significant and 
positive effects of size of bank (β = 0.347, at the 1% 
level); SAD (β 0.169, at the 10% level). The Table also 
shows significant and negative affects culture based 
on uncertainty avoidance (β = -0.372, at the 5% 
level). The Table also shows significant and negative 
affects for Corruption Index (β = -0.455, at the 5% 
level). According to model 3 (FS); the Table presents 
significant and positive affects accounting standards 
(β = 0.811, at the 1% level); size and profitability (β = 
0.390, at the 1% level and β = 0.024, at the 5% level 
respectively). 
It also shows significant and negative effects of 
ownership (β = -0.192, at the 5 level) and significant 
and negative affects for literacy rate (β = -0.500, at 
the 1% level). According to Model 4 (aggregate 
disclosure); there is a significant and positive effects 
of accounting standards (β = 0.458, at the 5% level); 
size of bank (β 0.246, at the 5% level) and SAD (β = 
0.486, at the 1% level). Table also shows significant 
and negative effects of power distance (β = -0.251, at 
the 10% level); Masculinity (β = -0.218, at the 10% 
level) and uncertainty avoidance (β =-0.291, at the 5% 
level). 
Model 5 (Holistic Sharia disclosure) reports 
significant and positive effects of SAD (β = 0.226, at 
the 1%) and GDP growth (β = 0.432, at the 5% level). 
Table also shows negative effects of power distance 
(β = -0.301, at the 10% level). Model 6 (Holistic social 
disclosure) shows positive affects GDP growth (β = 
0.469, at the 10% level) and negative association with 
role of central bank (β = 0.381, at the 10% level). 
Model 7 (Holistic financial disclosure); shows 
significant and positive affects standards adopted 
by banks (β = 0.778, at the 1% level); size of bank (β = 
0.387, at the 1% level); SAD (β 0.159, at the 10% 
level); corruption level (β = 0.335, at the 5% level) 
and legal system (β = 0.227, at the 10% level). Table 
also shows negative affects riskiness (β = -0.220, at 
the 5% level); ownership (β = -0.266, at the 1% level); 
full adoption of AAOIFI and literacy rate (β = -0.361, 
at the 10% level and β = -0.420, at the 5% level 
respectively). Model 8 (Holistic aggregate disclosure) 
reports significant and positive affects SAD (β = 
0.331, at the 1% level); GDP growth (β 0.518, at the 
5% level) and legal system (β = 0.261, at the 1% level). 
 
Table 13. Summary of hypotheses’ research 
 
 
H1 
Standards 
H2 
Auditor 
H3 
Age 
H4 
Size 
H5 
Profitability 
H6 
Risk 
H7 
Leverage 
H8 
SAD 
H9 
Ownership 
Model 1 
(SSBR) 
R R R R R R R A+ R 
Model 2 
(CSRR) 
R R R A+ R R R A+ R 
Model 3 
(Financial) 
A+ R R A+ A+ R R R A- 
Model 4 
(Aggregate) 
A+ R R A+ R R R A+ R 
Model 5 
(Holistic 
Sharia) 
R R R R R R R A+ R 
Model 6 
(Holistic 
social) 
R R R R R R R R R 
Model 7 
(Holistic 
financial) 
A+ R R A+ R A- R A+ A- 
Model 8 
(Holistic ) 
R R R R R R R A+ R 
Final results 
Partially 
accepted 
Totally 
rejected 
Totally 
rejected 
Partially 
accepted 
Partially 
accepted 
Partially 
accepted 
Totally 
rejected 
Partially 
accepted 
Partially 
accepted 
Notes: (A) is accepted hypothesis; (R) is rejected hypothesis. 
 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis reports, as expected, that STAit (our 
proxy for accounting standards) is positive and 
marginally significant with Models 3 and 7. This 
result shows the impact of AAOIFI adoption on 
enhancing disclosure level related to financial 
accountability disclosure. This result is consistent 
with Ariss and Sarieddine, (2007) who argued that 
the adoption of accounting standards will help to 
enhance their level of disclosure. It also consistent 
with Besar et al. (2009) who argue that one of the 
main tools to enhance the Islamic banking industry 
is adopting Islamic standards. Therefore, H1 is 
accepted partially for model 3, 4 and 7. Related to 
the size of the auditor; the coefficient estimates on 
2AUD is insignificant related to all accountabilities 
disclosure models. The results suggest that the 
disclosure levels about accountability pillars are not 
affected by the size of the larger auditor. Therefore, 
H2 is rejected. This result is matching with several 
studies that found no association between 
disclosure level and audit firm size (e.g., McNally 
et al., 1982; Ali et al., 2012; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako 
et al., 2006) 
Table 13 regarding the size of bank reports, as 
expected, that SIZEit is positive significant in 2; 3; 4 
and 7 models which relate to more social and 
aggregate disclosure. This suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between bank size and their 
CSR disclosure. This result is consistent with Mallin 
and Michelon (2011), Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), 
Brammer et al. (2006), McWilliams and Siegel (2001) 
where they argue that big banks are highly likely to 
monitor their activities towards wider society. 
However, our result does not match with other 
studies that found a positive association between 
firm size and levels of disclosures (e.g., Chavent 
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et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2009). Therefore, H4 is 
partially accepted. Table 13 also shows that ROAit 
(our proxy for profitability) is insignificant with all 
models except model 3 related to FS disclosure. The 
results show an impact of profitability on enhancing 
disclosure level related to CSR disclosure. This result 
is not consistent with Gray et al. (2001), Othman 
et al. (2009) who found a significant association 
between profitability and corporate disclosure. But 
our result is matching Haniffa (2002) who argues 
that a firm from an Islamic approach should provide 
full disclosure regardless of the financial position or 
profitability. Therefore, we accepted H5, which 
debated is no link between profitability and 
corporate disclosure for IBs. This result 
differentiates IBs as compared to conventional banks 
that link their disclosure level to their profitability 
performance.  
Table 13 illustrates, unexpectedly, that leverage 
is insignificant with all models of the disclosure. 
This result is consistent with Abraham and Cox 
(2007), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Rajab and 
Schachler (2009) who found an insignificant 
association between the disclosure and leverage 
ratio. Our result does not match other studies that 
found a positive association between leverage and 
disclosure (e.g., Elshandidy, 2011; Marshall & 
Weetman, 2007; Taylor et al., 2010). Therefore, H7 is 
rejected. Regarding the association between SAD and 
disclosure levels; the results indicate that the 
coefficient estimates on SDEPit are significant for all 
models except models (3 & 7) related to CSRR. 
Therefore, H8 is accepted. This result is consistent 
with studies that show a significant association 
between disclosure and internal auditing department 
as Archambeault et al. (2008). Also, the literature 
provides evidence that internal auditing has positive 
effects on financial reporting oversight and 
reliability (Schneider & Wilner, 1990). Table 14 
summarizes the status of the whole hypotheses 
based on our 8 regression models. 
 
Table 14. Determinants of Islamic accountability pillars disclosure (regression analysis) 
 
Variables/ 
Models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
VIF Standar-
dized β 
Standar-
dized β 
Standar-
dized β 
Standar-
dized β 
Standar-
dized β 
Standar-
dized Β 
Standar-
dized β 
Standar-
dized β 
Constant 
STAit 0.353 0.063 0.811*** 0.458** 0.253 0.115 0.778*** 0.323 7.151 
AUDit 0.049 0.110 0.107 0.100 -0.132 -0.157 0.055 -0.154 2.664 
SIZEit 0.009 0.347*** 0.395*** 0.246** 0.136 0.112 0.387*** 0.188 2.599 
ROAit -0.049 -0.072 0.024** -0.042 -0.056 0.006 0.047 -0.026 1.369 
LEVit 0.043 0.097 0.196 0.116 0.113 0.176 0.129 0.189 2.580 
SADit 0.581*** 0.169* 0.122 0.486*** 0.465*** 0.028 0.159* 0.331*** 1.701 
OWNit 0.099 0.080 -0.192** 0.052 0.038 0.066 -0.266*** 0.029 1.464 
AGEit -0.006 0.073 0.028 0.032 0.007 0.140 0.082 0.092 1.339 
RISKit -0.025 0.009 -0.184 -0.052 -0.006 -0.122 -0.220** -0.106 1.623 
POWit -0.222 -0.218 -0.054 -0.251* -0.301* -0.039 -0.102 -0.224 4.267 
INDit -0.026 -0.072 0.040 -0.040 0.001 0.236 0.039 0.161 7.522 
MASit -0.184 -0.191 -0.070 -0.218* -0.126 -0.191 -0.077 -0.200 2.727 
UNCit -0.195 -0.372** -0.009 -0.291** -0.013 -0.030 0.007 -0.026 4.705 
GDPit 0.198 0.281 -0.048 0.224 0.432** 0.469* 0.003 0.518** 7.819 
CORRit -0.171 -0.445** 0.310 -0.220 -0.213 0.026 0.335** -0.077 6.291 
LEGit 0.069 0.097 0.181 0.124 0.157 0.243 0.227* 0.261* 3.349 
CENTit 0.048 -0.157 -0.181 -0.073 -0.011 -0.381* -0.174 -0.229 5.740 
ADOPTit -0.074 0.223 -0.320 -0.043 -0.037 0.122 -0.361* -0.014 8.332 
LITit 0.125 -0.076 -0.500*** -0.067 0.303 -0.325 -0.420** -0.038 7.574 
SYSit 0.046 -0.143 0.052 -0.016 0.043 0.057 0.149 0.077 5.988 
Model Summary: 
R2 0.464 0.484 0.569 0.573 0.424 0.270 0.571 0.420 
 F 4.154 4.503 6.337 6.440 3.536 1.775 6.384 3.481 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the regression matrix for the 8 models in 2013. STA
it
: Financial standard (AAOIFI or IFRS); AUD
it
: Size 
of auditor (Big-4 firms); AGE
it
:bank age since foundation; SIZE
it
: Bank size (natural logarithm of bank’s total assets in US$ as a proxy for 
bank size); ROA
it
: Return of Asset (Profitability); RISK
it
: Risk adequacy (Tier 1 Capital); LEV
it
: Gearing (TD/TA); SDEP
it
: Existing Sharia 
department; OWN
it
: Public or Private Ownership; Hofstede Model for culture (Power distance: POW
it
 ; Individualism: IND
it
; Masculinity: 
MAS
it
 and Uncertainty avoidance: UNC
it
 ); GDP
it
: GDP growth (natural logarithm of the gross domestic product of country i as a proxy 
for country macro-economic factors); CORR
it
: Corruption perception index; LEG
it
: Country legal system (Sharia law and other as 
common and code); CENT
it
: Role of central bank for SSB and Social; ADOPT
it
: Full adoption of country for AAOIFI; LIT
it
: Literacy rate for 
country; SYS
it
: Complete Islamization banking country system. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% levels. 
 
This paper seeks to explore different kinds of 
disclosure related to IBs which contain Sharia, social 
and financial as well as aims at measure the 
association between these different categories of 
disclosure and firm-specific characteristics. The 
disclosure levels are measured through three indices 
for CSR; SSB and Financial statements based on 
AAOIFI standards and several previous studies. 
Furthermore, the disclosure levels contain all 
sections in the annual report. Based on our analysis; 
the descriptive analysis shows relatively high 
disclosure level for financial level and SSBR (62% and 
52% respectively) and relatively low for CSR 
disclosure (28%). Concerned with holistic disclosure 
level that measuring accountability’ pillars for all 
sections in the annual report, disclosure levels about 
Sharia, social and financial are 40%; 28% and 81% 
respectively. 
Our results show that adopting AAOIFI 
standards is positive and marginally significant with 
financial disclosure rather than other kinds of 
disclosure which matching with Besar et al. (2009) 
and reflects the importance of adopting AAOIFI for 
all IBs. Our analysis shows that whatever the age of 
IBs, it does not impact on the disclosure level which 
consists of Alsaeed (2006). Furthermore, our 
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analysis displays the importance of size as one of 
the determinants related to disclosure. This finding 
matches with Mallin and Michelon’s (2011), Brammer 
et al. (2006). As Haniffa (2002) argues, from an 
Islamic perception, IBs should provide full 
disclosure whether it is making a profit or otherwise. 
Our result proves her argument by showing 
insignificant association between disclosure and 
profitability. The same result for profitability is 
repeated with risk level as well leverage which shows 
insignificant correlation with disclosure levels as 
Dobler et al. (2011) concluded for the risk and Rajab 
and Schachler (2009) argue for the leverage. One of 
the main important results of this study is shown 
for what SAD effect on disclosure level. Chik (2011) 
described the existing of Internal sharia auditing as 
the true accountability, where IBs is not only 
accountable to their stakeholders or authorities but 
most significantly to Allah as part of the religious 
responsibility to be the best solution to achieve good 
corporate governance. 
As such the results of this study should be of 
implication to policymakers, Islamic windows, 
regulators and stakeholders, particularly investors. 
However, our study is limited by focusing on one 
year, which motivates further research that can 
consider time series which can show the extent to 
which the disclosure levels changes and the extent 
to which it impacts the financial performance. Based 
on the significant impacts of the culture on the 
disclosure levels for corporations particularly 
related to Islamic values, we recommend exploring 
the impact of Islamic culture on the disclosure levels 
by more core analysis. Moreover, related to financial 
accountability disclosure we limit our study by not 
measuring the earning management issues in the 
annual report for IBs. Therefore, we recommend 
exploring the extent to which the disclosure in the 
annual report contains any level of earning 
management. We focused only on IBs, which suggest 
further research to contain other IFIs. Finally; this 
study tests only the firm characterises as ROA and 
standards with disregard the impacts of corporate 
governance on this kind of disclosure which asking a 
further research. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Abbasi, T., Kausar, A., Ashiq, H., Inam, H., Nasar, H., & Amjad, R. (2012). Corporate social responsibility 
disclosure: A comparison between Islamic and conventional financial institutions in Bahawalpur region. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 3(3), 51-61.  
2. Abd-Elsalam, H. (1999). The introduction and application of international accounting standards to accounting 
disclosure regulations of a capital market in developing country: The case of Egypt (PhD Thesis, Herriot-Watt 
University, UK). 
3. Abdul Rahman, A., & Bukair, A. (2013). The influence of the Sharia supervision board on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure by Islamic banks of gulf co-operation council countries. Asian Journal of Business and 
Accounting, 6(2), 65-104.  
4. Abdul Rahman, A., Md. Hashim, M. F. A., & Abu Bakar, F. (2010). Corporate social reporting: A preliminary study 
of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting, 4(1), 18-39. Retrieved 
from the World Wide Web: https://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/ISEA/article/view/939/860 
5. Abraham, S., & Cox, P. (2007), Analysing the determinants of narrative risk information in UK FTSE 100 annual 
reports. The British Accounting Review, 39(3), 227-248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2007.06.002 
6. Accounting and auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions (AAOIFI). (2010). Sharia review 
(Governance standard No.2). Retrieved from the World Wide Web: http://aaoifi.com/?lang=en 
7. Accounting and auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions (AAOIFI). (2010). Corporate social 
responsibility conduct and disclosure for IFIs (Governance standard No.7). Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
http://aaoifi.com/?lang=en 
8. Accounting and auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions (AAOIFI). (2010). General presentation 
and disclosure in the financial statements of Islamic banks and financial institutions (Accounting standard No.1). 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web: http://aaoifi.com/?lang=en 
9. Accounting and auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions (AAOIFI). (2010). Sharia Supervisory 
Board: Appointment, Compositions and Report (Governance standard No.1). Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
http://aaoifi.com/?lang=en 
10. Accounting and auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions (AAOIFI). (2010). Accounting and 
auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions; independence of Sharia supervisory board (Governance 
standard No.5). Retrieved from the World Wide Web: http://aaoifi.com/?lang=en 
11. Adnan, M., & Gaffikin, M. (1997). The Shariah, Islamic banks and accounting concepts and practices accounting, 
commerce and finance. Paper presented at the International Conference: The Islamic Perspective, Sydney, 
Australia. 
12. Ahmed, K., & Courtis, J. K. (1999). Association between corporate characteristics on mandatory disclosure 
compliance in annual reports. A meta-analysis. The British Accounting Review, 31(1), 35-61. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/bare.1998.0082 
13. Ahmed, K., & Nicholls, D. (1994). The impact of non-financial company characteristics on mandatory disclosure 
compliance in developing countries: The case of Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting, Education 
and Research, 29, 62-77.  
14. Akhtaruddin, M. (2005). Corporate mandatory disclosure practices in Bangladesh. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 40(4), 399-422. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2005.09.007 
15. Al-Baluchi, A. E. A. (2006). The impact of AAOIFI standards and other bank characteristics on the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks (Doctoral thesis, University of Surrey). Retrieved 
from the World Wide Web: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/801/1/fulltext.pdf 
16. Al-Humedhi, H. (1999). An analysis of bureaucratic accountability in the American public sector and its 
implications for the Saudi bureaucracy. Journal of King Saud University-Science, 11(1), 1-18. 
17. Ali, S., Shafique, A., Razi, A., & Aslam, U. (2012). Determinants of profitability of Islamic banks: A case study of 
Pakistan. Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3(11), 86-99. 
18. Al-Jirari, A. (1996). Accountability in Islam. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: http//abbesjirari.com 
Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions/ Volume 8, Issue 3, 2018 
 
39 
19. Alsaeed, K. (2006). The association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure: The case of Saudi 
Arabia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(5), 476-496. https://doi.org/10.1108/02686900610667256 
20. Al-Tuwaijri, S. A., Christensen, T. E., & Hughes, K. E. (2004). The relations among environmental disclosure, 
environmental performance, and economic performance: A simultaneous equations approach. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 29(5–6), 447-471. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(03)00032-1 
21. Andres, P., & Vallelado, E. (2009). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 32(12), 2570-2580. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.008 
22. Annuar, H. A., Sulaiman, M., & Ahmad, N. N. N. (2009). Some evidence of environmental reporting by Shari'ah 
compliant companies in Malaysia. IIUM Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, 17 (2), 177-208. 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web: http://irep.iium.edu.my/3395/ 
23. Archambault, J. J., & Archambault, M. E. (2003). A multinational test of determinants of corporate disclosure. 
The International Journal of Accounting, 38(2), 173-194. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0020-7063(03)00021-9 
24. Archambeault, D. S., DeZoort, F. T., & Holt, T. P. (2008). The need for an internal auditor report to external 
stakeholders to improve governance transparency. Accounting Horizons, 22(4), 375-388. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.2008.22.4.375 
25. Aribi, Z. A., & Gao, S. S. (2012). Narrative disclosure of corporate social responsibility in Islamic financial 
institutions. Managerial Auditing Journal, 27(2), 199-222. https://doi.org/10.1108/02686901211189862 
26. Ariss, R., & Sarieddine, Y. (2007). Challenges in implementing capital adequacy guidelines to Islamic banks. 
Journal of Banking Regulation, 9(1), 46-59. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jbr.2350059 
27. Askary, S., & Clarke, F. (1997). Accounting in the koranic verses, accounting, commerce and finance. Paper 
presented at the Islamic Perspective International Conference, Sydney. 
28. Bailey, A. D., Gramling, A. A., & Ramamoorti, S. (2003). Research opportunities in internal auditing. Altamonte 
springs, FL: The IIA Research Foundation. 
29. Barako, D. G., Hancock, P., & Izan, H. Y. (2006). Factors influencing voluntary corporate disclosure by Kenyan 
companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(2), 107-125. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2006.00491.x 
30. Baydoun, N., & Willett, R. (2000). Islamic corporate reports. Abacus, 36(1), 71-90. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
6281.00054 
31. Beattie, V., McInnes, W., & Fearnley, S., (2004). A methodology for analysing and evaluating narratives in annual 
reports: A comprehensive descriptive profile and metrics for disclosure quality attributes. Accounting Forum, 
28(3), 205-236. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2004.07.001 
32. Belal, A. R., Abdelsalam. O, & Nizamee, S. S. (2014). Ethical reporting in Islami bank Bangladesh limited (1983-
2010). Journal of Business Ethics, 129(4), 769-784. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2133-8 
33. Besar, M. H. A. H., Abd Sakor, M. E., Muthalib, N. A., & Gunawa, A. Y. (2009). The practice of Sharia review as 
undertaken by Islamic Banking Sector in Malaysia. International Review of Business Research Papers, 5(1), 294-
306. 
34. Biddle, G. C., & Saudagaran, S. M. (1989). The effects of financial disclosure levels on firms' choices among 
alternative foreign stock exchange listings. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 1(1), 
55-87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-646X.1989.tb00004.x 
35. Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level of cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review, 72(3), 323-349. 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web: https://www.jstor.org/stable/248475 
36. Brammer, S., Brooks, C., & Pavelin, S. (2006). Corporate social performance and stock returns: UK evidence from 
disaggregate measures. Financial Management, 35(3), 97-116. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053X. 
2006.tb00149.x 
37. Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., & Raghunandan, K. (2005). Changes in internal auditing during the time of the 
major U.S. accounting scandals. International Journal of Auditing, 9(2), 117-127. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1099-1123.2005.00273.x 
38. Chavent, M, Ding, Y., Fu, L., Stolowy, H., & Wang, H. (2006). Disclosure and determinants studies: An extension 
using the divisive clustering method (DIV). European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, 15(2), 181-
218. 
39. Chik, M. (2011) Shariah audit: Shariah perspective. Paper presented at the International Shariah Audit 
Conference, Kuala Lumpur.  
40. Cooke, E. (1991). An assessment of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Japanese corporations. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 26, 174-189. 
41. Daoud, H. (1996). Sharia control in Islamic banks (1st ed). Cairo: The International Institute of Islamic Thought. 
42. Debreceny, R., & Rahman, A., (2005). Firm-specific determinants of continuous corporate disclosures. The 
International Journal of Accounting, 40(3), 249-278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2005.06.002 
43. Dobler, M., Lajili, K., & Zeghal, D. (2011). Attributes of corporate risk disclosure: an international investigation 
in the manufacturing sector. Journal of International Accounting Research, 10(2), 1-22. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/jiar-10081 
44. Dong, M., & Stettler, A. (2011). Estimating firm-level and country-level effects in cross-sectional analyses: An 
application of hierarchical modelling in corporate disclosure studies. The International Journal of Accounting, 
46(3), 271-303. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2011.07.002 
45. Doupnik, S., & Tsakumis, T. (2004). A critical review of tests of Gray theory of cultural relevance and 
suggestions for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature, 23, 1-48.  
46. El-Gamal, M. A. (2006). Islamic finance: Law, economics, and practice. Houston: Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753756 
47. El-Halaby, S., & Hussainey, K. (2016). Determinants of compliance with AAOIFI standards by Islamic banks. 
International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 9(1), 143-168. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/IMEFM-06-2015-0074 
48. Elshandidy, T. M. F. (2011). Risk reporting incentives: A cross-country study (Thesis submitted to the Accounting 
and Finance Division, the University of Stirling).  
49. Elshandidy, T., Fraser, I., & Hussainey, K. (2013), aggregated, voluntary, and mandatory risk disclosure 
incentives: Evidence from UK FTSE all-share companies. International Review of Financial Analysis, 30, 320-333. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2013.07.010 
Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions/ Volume 8, Issue 3, 2018 
 
40 
50. Emdadul Haq, M. (2010). Orientation of accountability in Islam. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-152252 
51. Eng, L., & Mak, Y., (2002). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 22(4), 325-345. 
52. Epstein, M., & Pava, M. (1993). The shareholder’s use of corporate annual reports. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.  
53. Farag, H., Mallin, B., & Ow-Yong, K. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance in Islamic 
banks. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 103, S21-S38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.03.001 
54. Farook, S., Hassan, M. K., & Lanis, R. (2011). Determinants of corporate social responsibility: The case of Islamic 
banks. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research. 2(2), 114-141. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
17590811111170539 
55. Firth, M. (1979). The impact of size, stock market listing, and auditors on voluntary disclosure in corporate 
annual reports. Accounting and Business Research, 9, 273-280. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
00014788.1979.9729168 
56. Gisbert, A., & Navallas, B. (2013). The association between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance in the 
presence of severe agency conflicts. Advances in Accounting, 29(2), 286-298. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.adiac.2013.07.001 
57. Golob, U., & Barllett, J. L. (2007). Communicating about corporate social responsibility: A comparative study of 
CSR reporting in Australia and Slovenia. Public Relations Review, 33(1), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.pubrev.2006.11.001 
58. Gramling, A., Marletta, M., & Church, B. (2004). The role of the internal audit function in corporate governance: 
A synthesis of the extant internal audit literature and directions for future research. Journal of Accounting 
Literature, 23, 194-244. 
59. Gray, S. J. (1988). Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of accounting systems 
internationally. Abacus, 24(1), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6281.1988.tb00200.x 
60. Gray, R., Javad, M., Power, D. M., & Sinclair, C. D. (2001). Social and environmental disclosure and corporate 
characteristics: A research note. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 28(3-4), 327-356. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00376 
61. Gray, S. J., Meek, G. K., & Roberts, C. B. (1995). International capital market pressures and voluntary annual 
report disclosures by US and UK multinationals. Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 6(1), 43-68. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-646X.1995.tb00049.x 
62. Hameed, S. (2001). Islamic accounting: Accounting for the new millennium? Paper presented at the Asia Pacific 
Conference 1 – Accounting in the New Millennium, Kota Bharu, Malaysia. 
63. Han, S., Kang, T, & Yoo, Y. K. (2012). Governance role of auditors and legal environment: Evidence from 
corporate disclosure transparency. European Accounting Review, 21(1), 29-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
09638180.2011.599928 
64. Haniffa, R. M., & Hudaib, M. A. (2002). A theoretical framework for the development of the Islamic perspective 
of accounting. Accounting, and Commerce & Finance: The Islamic Perspective Journal, 6(1-2), 1-71. 
65. Haniffa, R., (2002). Social reporting disclosure – An Islamic perspective. Indonesian Management & Accounting 
Research (IMAR journal), 1(2), 128-146. 
66. Haniffa, R. M., & Cooke, T. E. (2002). Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysian corporations. 
Abacus, 38(3), 317-349. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6281.00112 
67. Haniffa, M., & Hudaib, M. (2004). Disclosure practices of Islamic financial institutions: An exploratory study 
(Working Paper No. 04/32, Bradford School of Management) 
68. Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2007). Exploring the ethical identity of Islamic banks via communication in annual 
reports. Journal of Business Ethics, 76(1), 97-116. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9272-5 
69. Hasan, B. A., & Siti-Nabiha, A. K. (2010). Towards good accountability: The role of accounting in Islamic 
religious organisations. International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and 
Industrial Engineering, 4(6), 1141-1147. 
70. Hasan, Z. (2008). Corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions. Paper presented at the Conference on 
Malaysian Study of Islam, Lamperter, UK. 
71. Hassan, N. H. C., Yusoff, H., & Yatim, N. (2012). Disclosing social responsibility information via the Internet: A 
study on companies in Malaysia. International Journal of Arts and Commerce, 1(5), 83-96. Retrieved from the 
World Wide Web: https://www.ijac.org.uk/images/frontImages/gallery/Vol.1No.5/9.pdf 
72. Hassan, A. (2009). Risk management practices of Islamic banks of Brunei Darussalam. The Journal of Risk 
Finance, 10(1), 23-37. https://doi.org/10.1108/15265940910924472 
73. Hassan, A., & Harahap, S. S. (2010). Exploring corporate social responsibility disclosure: the case of Islamic 
banks. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 3(3), 203-227. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/17538391011072417 
74. Hassan, O. A. G., Romilly, P., Giorgioni, G., & Power, D. (2009). The value relevance of disclosure: Evidence from 
the emerging capital market of Egypt. The International Journal of Accounting, 44(1), 79-102. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2008.12.005 
75. Hidayat, S. (2010). Bahraini Islamic finance outlook 2010: A mixed picture. Islamic Finance News, 7(46), 13-14. 
76. Hodge, F. D. (2001). Hyperlinking unaudited information to audited financial statements: Effects on investor 
judgments. The Accounting Review, 76(4), 675-691. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2001.76.4.675 
77. Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across 
nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
78. Hope, O.-K. (2003). Firm-level disclosures and the relative roles of culture and legal origin. Journal of 
International Financial Management & Accounting, 14(3), 218-248. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-646X.00097 
79. Hossain, M., Islam, K., & Andrew, J. (2006). Corporate Social and environmental disclosure in developing 
countries: Evidence from Bangladesh. Paper presented at the Asian pacific conference on International 
Accounting Issues, Hawaii, US. 
80. Hossain, M., Tan, M., & Adams, M. (1994). Voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital market: Some empirical 
evidence from companies listed on Kuala Lumpur stock exchange. The International Journal of Accounting, 
29(4), 334-351. 
81. Ibrahim, W. H. W., Ismail, A. G., Zarabia, W. N. W. M. (2011). Disclosure, risk and performance in Islamic 
banking: A panel data analysis. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 72, 100-114. 
Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions/ Volume 8, Issue 3, 2018 
 
41 
82. Jamali, D., Safieddine, A. M., & Rabbath, M. (2008). Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
synergies and interrelationships. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(5), 443-459. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00702.x 
83. Kamla, R., & Rammal, H. G. (2013). Social reporting by Islamic banks: Does social justice matter? Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 26(6), 911-945. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-03-2013-1268 
84. Karim, R. A. A. (1995). The nature and rational of a conceptual framework for financial reporting by Islamic 
banks. Accounting & Business Research, 25(100), 285-300. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1995.9729916 
85. Khan, M. H. (2010). The effect of corporate governance elements on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reporting: Empirical evidence from private commercial banks of Bangladesh. International Journal of Law and 
Management, 52(2), 82-109. https://doi.org/10.1108/17542431011029406 
86. Kuran, T. (2004). Islam and mammon: The economic predicaments of Islamism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400837359 
87. Leuz, C., & Wysocki, P. D. (2008). Economic consequences of financial reporting and disclosure regulation: A 
review and suggestions for future research. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398 
88. Lewis, M. (2001). Islam and accounting. Accounting Forum, 25(2), 103-127.  
89. Lewis. M. K. (2006). Accountability and Islam. Paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on 
Accounting and Finance in Transition, Adelaide, Australia. 
90. Linsley, P. M., & Shrives, P. J. (2006). Examining risk reporting in UK public companies. Journal of Risk Finance, 
6(4), 292-305. https://doi.org/10.1108/15265940510613633 
91. Maali, B., Casson, P., & Napier, C. (2006). Social reporting by Islamic banks. Abacus, 42(2), 266-289. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6281.2006.00200.x 
92. Maali, B., & Napier, C. (2010). Accounting, religion and organizational culture: The creation of Jordan Islamic 
Bank. Journal of Islamic Accounting & Business Research, 1(2), 92-113. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
17590811011086705 
93. Mallin, C. A., & Michelon, G. (2011). Board reputation attributes and corporate social performance: An empirical 
investigation of the US best corporate citizens. Accounting and Business Research, 41(2), 119-144. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2011.550740 
94. Mallinb, C., Faraga, H., & Ow-Yonga, K. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance in 
Islamic banks. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 103, S21-S38. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jebo.2014.03.001 
95. Marshall, A., & Weetman, P. (2007). Modelling transparency in disclosure: The case of foreign exchange risk 
management. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 34(5-6), 705-739. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
5957.2007.02007.x 
96. Marston, C., & Polei, A. (2004). Corporate reporting on the internet by German companies. International Journal 
of Accounting Information Systems, 5(3), 285-311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accinf.2004.02.009 
97. Marston, C. L., & Shrives, P. J. (1991). The use of disclosure indices in accounting research: A review article. The 
British Accounting Review, 23(3), 195-210. https://doi.org/10.1016/0890-8389(91)90080-L 
98. McKernan, J. F., & MacLullich, K. K. (2004). Accounting, love and justice. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 17(3), 327-360. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570410545777 
99. McNally, G. M., Eng, L. H., & Hasseldine, C. R. (1982). Corporate financial reporting in New Zealand: An analysis 
of user preferences, corporate characteristics, and disclosure practices for discretionary information. 
Accounting and Business Research, 13(49), 11-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1982.9729725 
100. McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective. Academy of 
Management Review, 26(1), 117-127. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2001.4011987 
101. Mercer, M. (2004). How do investors assess the credibility of management disclosures? Accounting Horizons, 
18(3), 185-196. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.2004.18.3.185 
102. Messner, M (2009). The limits of accountability. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1429348 
103. Milne, M. J., & Adler, R. W. (1999). Exploring the reliability of social and environmental disclosures content 
analysis. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 12(2), 237-256. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
09513579910270138 
104. Mohammed, J. A. (2007). Corporate social responsibility in Islam (PhD thesis, Auckland University of 
Technology, Auckland). 
105. Muwazir, M., Muhamad, R., & Noordin, K. (2006). Corporate social responsibility disclosure: A tawhidic 
approach. Journal of Syariah, 14(1), 125-142.  
106. Naser, K., Jamal, A., & Al-Khatib, L. (1999). Islamic banking: a study of customer satisfaction and preferences in 
Jordan. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 17(3), 135-151. https://doi.org/10.1108/02652329910269275 
107. Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). The content analysis Guidebook. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc. 
108. Othman, R., Md Thani, A., & Ghani, E. K. (2009). Determinants of Islamic social reporting among top sharia-
approved companies in Bursa Malaysia. Research Journal of International Studies, 12, 4-20. Retrieved from the 
World Wide Web: http://lela.stiemj.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/Islamic-social-reporting-Kel6.pdf 
109. Ousama, A. A., & Fatima, A. H. (2010). Voluntary disclosure by Sharia approved companies: An exploratory 
study. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 8(1), 35-49. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
19852511011055943 
110. Patten, D. M. (1991). Exposure, legitimacy and social disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 10(4), 
297-308. https://doi.org/10.1016/0278-4254(91)90003-3 
111. Porter, B., Simon, J., & Hatherly, D. (2008). Principles of external auditing (3rd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
112. Quran. (2015). Quran holy book. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: https://quran.com/ 
113. Raffournier, B. (1995). The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies. The 
European Accounting Review, 4(2), 261-280. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638189500000016 
114. Rahman, N. H. W. A., Zain, M. M., & Al-Haj, N. H. Y. Y. (2011). CSR disclosures and its determinants: Evidence 
from Malaysian government link companies. Social Responsibility Journal, 7(2), 181-201. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/17471111111141486 
Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions/ Volume 8, Issue 3, 2018 
 
42 
115. Rajab, B., & Handley-Schachler, M. (2009). Corporate risk disclosure by UK firms: trends and determinants, 
World Review of Entrepreneurship. Management and Sustainable Development, 5(3), 224-243. 
https://doi.org/10.1504/ WREMSD.2009.026801 
116. Rashid, M., Abdeljawad. I., Ngalim, S. M., & Hassan, M. K. (2013). Customer-centric corporate social 
responsibility: A framework for Islamic banks on ethical efficiency. Management Research Review, 36(4), 359-
378. https://doi.org/10.1108/01409171311314978 
117. Roberts, R. W. (1992), Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Account. Organization and 
Society, 17(6), 595-612. https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(92)90015-K 
118. Said, Z., Yuserrie, H., & Haron, H. (2009). The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure 
and corporate governance characteristics in Malaysian public listed companies. Social Responsibility Journal, 
5(2), 212-226. https://doi.org/10.1108/17471110910964496 
119. Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K., & Stapleton, P. (2012). The extent of corporate governance disclosure 
and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt. Advances in Accounting, incorporating 
Advances in International Accounting, 28(1), 168-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2011.12.001 
120. Santema, S., Hoekert, M., Van De Rijt, J., & Van Oijen, A. (2005). Strategy disclosure in annual reports across 
Europe: A study on differences between five countries. European Business Review, 17(4), 352-366. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09555340510607398 
121. Sarea, A. M., & Hanefah, M. M. (2013). The need of accounting standards for Islamic financial institutions: 
evidence from AAOIFI. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 4(1), 64- 76. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/17590811311314294 
122. Schadewitz, H., & Blevins, D. (1998). Major determinants of interim disclosures in an emerging market. 
American Business Review, 16(1), 41-55. 
123. Schneider, A., & Wilner, N. (1990). A test of audit deterrent to financial reporting irregularities using the 
randomized response technique. The Accounting Review, 65(3), 668-681. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/247956 
124. Shahin, A., & Zairi, M. (2007). Corporate governance as a critical element for driving excellence in corporate 
social responsibility. International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 24(7), 753-770. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/02656710710774719 
125. Siwar, C., & Hossain, T. (2009). An analysis of Islamic CSR concept and the opinions of Malaysian managers. 
Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal, 20(3), 290-298. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
02656710710774719 
126. Stewart-Jacks, S. D. (2009). Sustainable accountability: A dualist Vedic perspective (Master thesis, The Victoria 
University of Wellington). 
127. Tarca, A. (2004). International convergence of accounting practices: Choosing between IAS and US GAAP. 
Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 15(1), 60-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
646X.2004.00102.x 
128. Taylor, G., Tower, G., & Neilson, J. (2010). Corporate communication of financial risk. Accounting and Finance, 
50, 417-446. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00326.x 
129. Ullah, S., & Jamali, D. (2010). Institutional investors and corporate social responsibility: The role of Islamic 
financial institutions. International Review of Business Research Papers, 6(1), 619-630. 
130. Vinnicombe, T. (2010). AAOIFI reporting standards: Measuring compliance. Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating, Advances in International Accounting, 26(1), 55-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2010.02.009 
131. Visser, H. (2009). Islamic finance: Principles and practice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.  
132. Wallace, R. S. O., & Naser, K. (1995). Firm-specific determinants of comprehensiveness of mandatory disclosure 
in the corporate annual reports of firms on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 14(4), 311-368. https://doi.org/10.1016/0278-4254(95)00042-9 
133. Warde, I. (2013). Islamic finance in the global economy. Paper presented at the CFA Institute Middle East 
Investment Conference, Dubai. 
134. Williams, G., & Zinkin, J. (2010). Islam and CSR: A study of the compatibility between the tenets of Islam and 
the UN global compact. Journal of Business Ethics, 91(4), 519-533. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0097-x 
135. Wilson, R. (1997). Islamic finance and ethical investment. International Journal of Social Economics, 24(11), 
1325-1342. https://doi.org/10.1108/03068299710193624 
136. Wong, S. (2012). The impact of culture on risk management disclosures: An exploratory study of international 
banks (DBA thesis, Southern Cross University, Lismore). Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
https://epubs.scu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1316&context=theses 
137. Xiao, J. Z., Yang, H., & Chow, C. W. (2004). Patterns and determinants of Internet-based corporate disclosure in 
China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(3), 191-225. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jaccpubpol.2004.04.002 
138. Young, O. (2006). Vertical interplay among scale-dependent resource regimes. Ecology and Society, 11(1), 1-16. 
https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-01519-110127 
139. Zarzeski, M. T. (1996). Spontaneous harmonization effects of culture and market forces on accounting 
disclosure practices. Accounting Horizons, 10, 18-37. 
 
 
